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Loss Allocation Under Pennsylvania's
Comparative Negligence System: Is it
"Fair"?*
I.

Introduction and Overview

Ten years ago, Pennsylvania joined the growing ranks of states
to adopt a system of comparative negligence by enacting the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act (CNA). 1 The CNA, adopted
* The author wishes to thank Richard W. Foltz and Robert E. Heideck of Pepper,
Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, for their helpful criticisms of this manuscript.
I. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982 and Supp. 1985). Act of July 9,
1976, P.L. 855, Act No. 152, eff. Sept. 7, 1976.

§ 7102. Comparative Negligence
(a) General rule.-In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the
causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
(b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.-Where recovery is allowed
against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of
his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full
amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is
not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than
his percentage share may seek contribution.
(c) Downhill skiing.(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly
contributing to the economy of this Commonwealth. It is recognzied that
as in some other sports, there are inherent risks in the sport of downhill
skiing.
(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill
skiing injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (b).
(d) Definitions.-As used in this section the following words and phrases shall
have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought." Includes
impleaded defendants.
"Plaintiff." Includes counterclaimants and cross-claimants.
Alabama, Delaware, Virginia and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions that
have not adopted comparative negligence as of the time of this writing. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, (1978 and 1985 Supp.). However, both Virginia and the District of Columbir
have adopted it in limited situations. One of these is where the plaintiff is an employee of a
common carrier. South Dakota and the District of Columbia specify that for the exception to
apply the employee's negligence must be "slight" in comparison to the "gross" negligence of
the employer/common carrier. Id. at 456. The "slight/gross" type of comparative negligence,
in which the defense of contributory negligence was no bar if there was a great quantitative
difference between the fault of the plaintiff and the fault of the defendant was the first type of
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with a minimum of legislative history,' was purportedly modeled af-

ter the influential Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act.' Yet due
to a slight but significant difference in the wording of the two Acts,'
differences in the statutory and judicial framework for contribution
between the two states, 5 and the widely-held belief on the part of
Pennsylvania courts and commentators that the state should forge its
own interpretative way, 6 Pennsylvania's system of comparative negli-

gence bears its own stamp of individuality. The two state-held policies of fully compensating injured plaintiffs7 and encouraging out of
comparative negligence system to gain acceptance in this country. Id. § 4.5, at 85-86. In Virginia, comparative negligence only applies in the limited situation where a failure to give statutory railroad signals is a proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 578-79. Alabama is still
waiting action by the legislature rather than the courts. Id. (1985 Supp.), at 257.
2. The legislative history is located at I PA. LEGIS. J. 1703-07 (Senate 1976). No
extensive review of the various options for a system of comparative negligence seems to have
been made during public debate.
3. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983). The Wisconsin Act was originally enacted in 1931.
4. The Wisconsin Act provides that contributory negligence shall not bar recovery if
such negligence is "not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought.
... (emphasis added). WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1983). Pennsylvania's CNA provides that the plaintiff is allowed to recover where such negligence is "not
greater that the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought.
... 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added). It is
likely due to the difference in wording that negligence of the plaintiff in Wisconsin is compared
with that of each defendant individually. Wisconsin initially followed the unit approach in
which the plaintiff's negligence is compared with that of each defendant separately, Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934), switched to the aggregate approach in May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis.2d 30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978), and then
switched back to the unit approach in Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis.2d 461, 290 N.W.2d 510
(1980). See infra text and accompanying notes 177-180.
5. Pennsylvania adopted a Contribution Act in 1951 PA. UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG
ToRTFEAsORs ACT, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-27 (Purdon 1982) [hereinafter PaCATA]. Wisconsin decided there was a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors by judicial decision prior to the enactment of its Comparative Negligence Act. (See Ellis v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1,
114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that contribution should be based
on proportional shares depending on degree of fault rather than on equal pro rata shares. Note
that Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Act adopted in 1931 does not provide for contribution, as does Pennsylvania's CNA. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045. The Pennsylvania CNA also
requires that each defendant be liable for that proportion of damages in the ratio of his causal
negligence to that of the other defendants, whereas Wisconsin's statute is silent on that point.
Another significant difference between the two acts is the provision for joint and several liability in the Pennsylvania Act and Wisconsin's silence as to that point. However, case law has
established joint and several liability as the rule in Wisconsin. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1,
6, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1962).
6. See Timby & Plevyak, The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute on Traditional Tort Concepts and Doctrines, 24 VILL. L. REV. 453, 462 (1979) (Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania). See also Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa. Super.
329, 351, 483 A.2d 474, 485 (1984) (although Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute is
cited by CNA's sponsor, the Pennsylvania legislature could not have intended to follow the
Wisconsin "individual" approach).
7. Pennsylvania holds the dual policies of ensuring an injured plaintiff a full tort recovery while not allowing a plaintiff to receive more than his tort recovery. These two values
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court settlements 8 also add substantially to the uniqueness of Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system.
The Pennsylvania CNA has two essential elements. First, CNA
abolishes the availability of contributory negligence as a complete
defense for the negligent tortfeasor, except in cases where the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the total negligence of the defendant
or defendants.9 Second, CNA allocates the negligence of all the parties including plaintiffs. CNA also applies to situations in which
there are two more more defendants but the plaintiff is absolutely
free of fault. 10 In cases where there are multiple defendants, CNA
addresses extremely complex issues of liability, contribution, indemnification, subrogation and settlement. Because of the extreme chariness with which the Pennsylvania courts have meted out holdings,
and because of its inherent difficulties, CNA-related litigation is an
area fraught with perplexing, unanswered questions that can stymie
even the most experienced practitioner.
In many major areas of comparative negligence law, the CNA
leaves open more questions than it answers. Is the plaintiff's negligence to be compared with each individual defendant's negligence or
with that of the defendants as an aggregate group?1 1 This question is
have had a significant impact on Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system as it has
evolved in its treatment of "secondary losses." A "secondary" loss is not the loss from the
accident itself, but rather the loss that results from the inability of of one or more of the
tortfeasors to pay its part of the judgment due to insolvency, or absence from suit. See Berg,
Comparative Contribution and Its Alternatives: The Equitable Distribution of Accident

Losses, 43 INs. COUNSEL J. 577, 586 (1976). In addition, Pennsylvania maintains a system of
joint and several liability, thus predicating, at least in cases involving multiple tortfeasors, that
these secondary losses are born by the defendants rather than being shared by both the plaintiff and the defendants. See infra text and accompanying notes 181-197.
8. See infra text and accompanying notes 63-70 relating to Pennsylvania's policy
favoring out-of-court settlement of law suits and the barriers its system of contributions poses
to that goal.
9. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 330 Pa. Super. 76, 478 A.2d 1359
(1984), reargument ordered, 510 A.2d 350 (1986). See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying
text.
It is important to note that Pennsylvania's system of comparative negligence really served
to codify a pre-existing de facto judicial effectuation of comparative negligence concepts. Prior
to the enactment of CNA it was common practice for juries, as a practical matter, to deliver a
compromise verdict so that a partly-at-fault plaintiff would not be completely foreclosed from
recovering by the contributory negligence bar but would nonetheless recover, albeit in a reduced amount due to his fault. See, e.g., Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150,
154 (1955); Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 115, 152 A.2d 238, 240 (1959); and Austin v.
Harnish, 227 Pa. Super. 199, 204, 323 A.2d 871, 874 (1974).
1I. Such a question is a consideration of great relevance in a "modified" system of
comparative negligence such as Pennsylvania's where a plaintiff can recover only if his negligence is "...

not greater than" the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against

whom recovery is sought ...." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added). See also supra note 4 and infra text and accompanying notes 177-80.
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paramount to a partially-at-fault plaintiff suing several tortfeasors,
each of whose negligence was less than the plaintiff's, but whose
combined negligence is greater than his. 12 Should a jury be informed
of the consequences of its apportionment of causal negligence? This
question is significant in a modified "not greater than" system such
as Pennsylvania's in which a plaintiff can recover if his negligence is
"less than" or "as great as" the negligence of the defendant or defendants, but is barred from recovering if his negligence is greater
than that of the defendant or defendants. 8
The CNA also placed precedential interpretations of its Contribution Act in question. Is a joint tortfeasor now required to be present at trial so that a proper allocation of fault according to CNA
can be assigned each tortfeasor, even if he had previously settled
with the plaintiff, or is his participation in the litigation excused once

he has settled? 14 Does the CNA impliedly overrule the Daugherty v.

12. That issue was finally decided seven years after the enactment of the Act in favor
of the "aggregate" position under which a plaintiff may recover from a less-negligent defendant as long as the aggregate negligence of all the defendants is not less than his. Elder v.
Orluck, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 483,A.2d 474 (1984).
13. A jury ignorant of this legal fact could conceivably allocate 51% negligence to the
plaintiff and 49% to the defendants, completely unaware that their finding would result in a
total bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Such a "blind" jury has even more impact on an "equal" or
"as great as" system where if both the plaintiff and defendant (or defendants) are found
equally negligent, plaintiff if foreclosed from recovery. The reason for the greater impact in
the "equal" system is the relatively common finding by the jury that plaintiff and defendant
are equally negligent, thus triggering a complete bar to plaintiff. The "not as great as," "as
great as," and "not greater than" systems are variants of the "hybrid" system of comparative
negligence so named because it is a hybrid of a system of no comparative negligence (plaintiff
is barred at a certain point in the 50% range) and pure comparative negligence where a faulty
plaintiff can recover no matter how much he was at fault, but where his recovery will be
reduced by his percentage of negligence. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, TORTS, § 67, at 473
(5th ed. 1984). Under the "pure" form of comparative negligence, where a plaintiff could
conceivably recover even if his negligence caused 99% of his injury (albeit with a potential
recovery of 1%of the verdict), the consequences of informing the jury of the consequences of
its apportionment has no relevance. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a jury
should be informed of the consequences of its apportionment in Peair v. Home Ass'n of Enola
Legion No. 751, 287 Pa. Super. 400, 430 A.2d 665 (1981).
Very few states have comprehensively answered many of the questions which arise in a
system of comparative negligence in their original statutes. Texas' statute goes a long way
towards completeness, but still left many substantive areas open. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 2212, 2212a, 2212b (Vernon 1985 Supp.). The new Texas comparative negligence statute,
Act of 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, p. 7105 eff. Sept. 1, 1985 is substantially similar to the
repealed version. Utah enacted a contribution statute, a comparative negligence statute, and a
reversal of the common law doctrine that a release of one tortfeasor releases all in its enactment of one statute. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43. See Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of a Release - A Triple Play by the
Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 406. The best and most comprehensively conceived act
is the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1986). See infra text and
accompanying notes 206-23.
14. See infra text and accompanying notes 134-35 and 151-58. CNA does not require
releasee to be present for fault apportionment purposes.
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Hershberger rule that a plaintiff may only recover from a non-settling joint tortfeasor that amount on a verdict not covered by a settlement with other joint tortfeasors, or does overpayment by a settler
under CNA mean that a non-settler is liable for his full proportional
share of any judgment rendered, regardless of a possible double recovery by plaintiff?"5
Other important substantive areas of law affect and are affected
by the interpretation of any system of comparative negligence. The
interrelationship between these substantive concerns and comparative negligence forces courts to decide significant issues in areas such
as product liability and assumption of risk. For example, in a system
of comparative negligence, how should the factfinder deal with the
fault of a tortfeasor who has placed a defective product on the market? Should the negligence of one actor be compared with the
"fault" in strict liability of the product manufacturer? Should the
product manufacturer bear the entire loss? Should the negligent consumer carry its own loss?"
15. See infra discussion of the Mong and Daugherty precedents, text and accompanying notes 67-75 and the Charles decision under CNA, infra notes 200-05 and accompanying
text.
16. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not made a final pronouncement on
this subject, several lower federal court decisions have been rendered. In Conti v. Ford Motor
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1429 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 195 (1984), Judge
Fullam concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not invoke the comparative
negligence doctrine in a products liability case. In holding for the plaintiff-wife, the court in
Conti did so in spite of a finding that the husband's negligence caused 75% of the accident,
whereas the defendant manufacturer's fault only produced 25% of the injury. Id. at 1432.
Because the fault of the party liable in product liability was not "on the same legal plane" as
the negligence of the user, the Pennsylvania Contribution Act also did not apply and Ford was
forced to bear the entire cost of the judgment. Accord, Bike v. American Motors Corp., 101
F.R.D. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
But see Smith v. Kolcraft Products, 107 F.R.D. 767 (M.D. Pa. 1985), in which Judge
Caldwell accepted the premise that a manufacturer of an infant care seat could be a "joint
tortfeasor" with a negligent driver who fell asleep at the wheel of a car. This was because the
two parties united to produce a single injury which could not be apportioned. "It is immaterial
to a finding of joint tortfeasor status that Kolcraft may be strictly liable and Smith negligent.
Theories of liability do not determine joint tortfeasor status. Kolcraft is entitled to contribution
or indemnity from Smith if his negligence is proven." Id. at 770.
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the liability of a
negligent party and a strictly liable party should be compared. The court based its ruling on
the Contribution Act rather than CNA. The court there held that Union Carbide, a strictly
liable defendant, was entitled to contribution from Columbus Lines, the negligent defendant
since Union Carbide had paid more than its pro rata share of a common liability. Rabatin v.
Columbus Lines, No. 84-4781 (May 2, 1986). Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, criticized
the Bike and Conti holdings, stating that those cases "missed the point." Id. at 4, n.I. See also
Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We Stand?
Where Do We Go? 29 VILL. L. REV. 695 (1984).
Rabatin relies on the scheme of allocation mapped out in Capuano v. Echo Bicycle Co.,
27 D.& C.3d 524 (Northamp. Cty. 1982) which held that the Contribution Act applies to
determine contribution rights between a strictly liable defendant and negligent defendants as a
group. Judge Gibbons, then, would not apply the CNA at all, since it controls merely the
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Assumption of risk issues have also arisen in CNA-related litigation. CNA raised the question whether assumption of risk was still
available as a complete defense in cases arising under the Act.1" In
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver City School District,18 a 1981 pluralrights of negligent defendants inter se and there was only one negligent defendant in Rabatin.
Id. Judge Gibbons concluded that since the Contribution Act was applicable, the only remaining question was whether the strictly liable defendant and the negligent defendant were joint
tortfeasors, thus coming within the jurisdiction of the Contribution Act. Id. at 6. This determination was made in the affirmative since their conduct caused a single harm which could not
be viewed independently of one another. Another factor leading to the finding of joint
tortfeasorhood was that they both could have "guarded against each others' conduct," id. at 7,.
and thereby could have prevented Rabatin's injuries: Union Carbide by refraining from making a defective product, and Columbus by taking proper precautions.
• Note that under Capuano, where a strictly liable party and a group of negligent defendants are involved, the negligent defendants will be treated as one defendant, and a one-half
share of the judgment will be allocated to them under the Contribution Act. Likewise, the
liability of the strictly liable party under the Contribution Act will amount to the other half of
the verdict. 27 D.&C.3d at 532-33. The liability of the negligent defendants inter se will then
be determined by the proportional liability rules of CNA. Id. The effect of this system, apparently, is to give heavy weight to the manufacturer's liability as compared with that of the
negligent defendants if it is less than 50% causally responsible for the injury and to give it
lighter weight if it is more. Neither Capuano nor Rabatin reaches the question as to whether
CNA should be read into the Contribution Act in this circumstance, so that the pro rata share
of the strictly liable party should be construed as a proportional share, as case law has already
established where only negligent parties are involved. See Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray
Corp., 638 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1981).
For a legislative response to this area, see S.621, § 8374 (1985) which allocates damages
and responsibility proportionally among strictly liable defendants and other negligent parties.
See also H. 2425 §,8374 (1986) and H. 2426 § 7105(b) (1986) to same effect.
Another wrinkle in the area of comparing product liability with other causal factors was
recently considered by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
, 502 A.2d 1264 (1985), the Pennsylvania Superior Court, en banc unanPa. Super. imously held that an asbestos defendant would have the right for a damage apportionment
between harm caused by plaintiff's cigarette smoking and plaintiff's exposure to asbestos.
Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), involved a Pennsylvania
state court's attempt to cope with the mixed question of product liability and negligence. The
case involved a radial tire which was held defective because it was not embossed with a warning not to mix it with non-radial tires. The negligence was driver fault. Sears, the supplier of
the tire, wanted the court to apportion the product liability and negligence according to CNA.
Although the superior court apportioned fault among all the parties whether negligent or
strictly liable, the case does not have precedential value. This is because in Dambacher the
issue was the nature of the jury instructions and not whether fault should be apportioned
between strictly liable and negligent actors. The latter issue was not properly preserved at the
trial court for appellate review according to the majority. Id. at 29, n.1, 485 A.2d at 412 n.l.
As Judge Wieand pointed out in his separate opinion, the majority holding that Sears waived
the apportionment issue was questionable. Id. at 88, n.6, 485 A.2d at 442, n.6 (Wieand, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Judge Wieand suggested that CNA was really intended as a comparative fault statute, and cited the Uniform Comparative Fault Act with approval, id. at 88,
485 A.2d at 443, therefore he was able to concur with the result reached by the majority.
17. The issue ultimately became whether assumption of risk in the primary sense would
be a bar to recovery under CNA. In primary assumption of risk, a plaintiff has given his
express consent to release the defendant of a duty to exercise care for his protection. He "takes
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
his chances" as to injury from a "known or possible risk .
TOTrs § 496A comment c (1965).
18. 496 Pa. 590, 612, 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 (1981). But see Vargus v. Pitman Mfg.
Co., 675 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1982) for the proposition that CNA does not preclude the defense of
assumption of risk in its primary sense.
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ity decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested in dicta that
the doctrine of assumption of risk should be completely abolished as
counterproductive to the aims of the Comparative Negligence Act.
Two years later, in Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 19 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the "Skiers Responsibility
Act," appended to CNA in 1980,0 would become meaningless un21
less the doctrine, at least in its primary sense, persisted.
Over the past ten years, the Pennsylvania state courts and fed-

eral district courts have painstakingly worked their way through
these and many other issues raised by the Comparative Negligence
Act. 2 2 Certain questions, however, have not yet been addressed by

the courts. Foremost of these is the question of the "phantom" defendant. Should the negligence of a tortfeasor who cannot be made a
party to the lawsuit, either because he is not amenable to suit in the
jurisdiction or because he cannot be found, be considered in the allo-

cation of fault under the Act? If so, who should bear the loss of this
uncollectable amount? 23 A related question concerns the immune
19.

716 F.2d 1002 (1983).

20. 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 7102(c) (Purdon 1982).

21. The statement in § 7102(c) that the doctrine of assumption of risk as it applies to
downhill skiing injuries is not modified by CNA is extremely cryptic since the interpretation
of the doctrine prior to the amendment to CNA had been in a state of extreme flux. The
Smith court, taking pains to inform the public that what it said was dicta, read § 7102(c) to
preserve the defense of assumption of risk in its primary sense in downhill skiing cases only.
Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1007, and n.4 (3d Cir. 1983).
It appears that economic factors led to the enactment of the "Skier's Responsibility Act"
rather than any need for defining the area of assumption of risk under Pennsylvania law. The
"Skier's Responsibility Act" is essentially a statement of several findings (that the sport is
practiced in Pennsylvania by many citizens of the Commonwealth, that it also attracts many
visitors from other jurisdictions and that there are inherent risks in the sport) followed by what
is in essence a veiled warning that skiers voluntarily assume the risk of the sport and will be
barred from recovery under CNA.
22. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (host
may assert contributory negligence of intoxicated minor guest as a defense to liability); Scattaregia v. Shin Shen Wu, 343 Pa. Super. 452, 495 A.2d 552 (1985) (husband's loss of consortium verdict is derivative, therefore should be reduced by percentage of wife's contributory
fault according to CNA); Werner v. Quality Service Oil Co., 337 Pa. Super. 264, 486 A.2d
1009 (1984) (combine percentages of husband's and wife's negligence in tenancy-by-entirety
property to determine whether CNA bars recovery); Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transp. Auth., 330 Pa. Super. 420, 479 A.2d 973 (1984) (joint and several liability applies to
Rule 238 delay damages where more than one defendant is involved); Beary v. Pennsy. Electric Co., 322 Pa. Super. 52, 469 A.2d 176 (1983) (directed verdicts inappropriate in CNA
cases); Kaiser v. 191 Presidential Corp., 308 Pa. Super. 301, 454 A.2d 141 (1982) (trial court
cannot sua sponte rearrange plaintiff's recovery to conform to contribution act); Heller v. Consol. Rail Corp., 576 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (railroad not liable for willful misconduct of
trespasser); Altamuro v. Milner Hotel Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (if rescue was
"reasonable" then compare negligence of rescuer and the party that created the dangerous
situation under CNA).
23. See infra notes 159-176 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the "phantom" tortfeasor problem. The issue has never explicitly been decided, but a common practice
has evolved, a practice that now has the weight of precedent. According to this practice, the
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tortfeasor. If a party is either statutorily immune or enjoys common
law immunity, should his theoretic percentage of negligence be taken
into account in the fault apportionment process under CNA? And if
so, who bears the risk of this secondary loss?24
This comment traces the system of loss allocation among
tortfeasors in Pennsylvania from the common law, through the adoption of the Pennsylvania Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and
up to its presently evolving form under CNA. It includes a discussion of the interrelation of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation
Act with CNA and its effect on the relationship between the liability
of the employer and a third party tortfeasor. The manner in which
Pennsylvania's systems of contribution and comparative negligence
interrelate to impact on the environment for out-of-court settlements
is also examined. In addition, the comment examines the loss allocation system with an eye towards determining wheher it has maintained a modicum of "fairness" both on an abstract level and according to the values expressed in state-held policies. Finally, this
comment discusses and evaluates alternative systems for loss allocation under comparative negligence, both systems which are now in
place in various jurisdictions and systems which have been proposed
by commentators, jurists and commissioners, including the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act.
II.

The Rule Against Contribution Among Tortfeasors

In early English common law, only one kind of joint tort existed
the "pure" joint tort, which imposed vicarious liability for concerted action.25 For example, if two bystanders acting in concert purposely tripped a jogger, at common law each tortfeasor would be
liable for the entire injury since each was "guilty" of having caused
the injury in the first place. 2 6 Since the act of one tortfeasor could be
negligence of the "phantom" tortfeasor does not enter into the loss allocation process. This
secondary loss is allocated among all the other defendants. A jury may also in practice proportionally enlarge the percentage of liability of all the parties, including the plaintiff-at-fault to
make up for this missing amount.
24. There is no case law as yet facing the issue of common law immunity under CNA.
There are, however, many decisions dealing with loss allocation when a statutorily immune
workers' compensation employer is involved in an accident in the workplace caused or partially
caused by a third party tortfeasor. See infra notes 101-50 and accompanying text.
25. W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, TORTS § 46, at 322 (5th ed. 1984).
26. The concept of joint torts grew up in the early action of trespass which was an
action in criminal law. The common law requirement that each of the tortfeasors is liable to
pay the entire amount has persisted up through the present time in Pennsylvania's system of
joint and several liability, which applies even where the tort is not a "pure" one involving
concerted effort towards a common goal.'See infra text and accompanying notes 181-97.
Such a theory of recovery now seems unduly harsh. This is because we have become
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imputed to another, the plaintiff could sue and recover the entire
judgment from either. If a plaintiff were left unsatisfied after proceeding against one tortfeasor, however, he could not sue the other.
His action had been "merged" into the judgment and there was no
cause of action remaining on which to sue. 7
Under this often-criticized common law system, the plaintiff
had consummate control over whom he wanted to sue. Since each
joint tortfeasor was liable for the whole amount, the plaintiff could
refuse tender from one tortfeasor in hopes of a larger recovery from
another.28 If, however, the two tortfeasors did not act in concert,
there would be two causes of action; and executing against one
tortfeasor would not foreclose a cause of action against the other for
the remainder of the verdict. This latter type of tort was called a
"concurrent" or "procedural tort." 9
In the United States, under the influence of the New York Field
Code of Procedure, the harsh rule that foreclosed a plaintiff from
executing on "pure" joint tortfeasors until full judgment was obtained was modified."0 The common law rule in the United States for
both the "pure" and "concurrent" tort became joint and several liability until full compensation, or satisfaction, was achieved. Execution was not permitted to go beyond that point so that unjust enrichment on the part of the plaintiff was prevented. 81 Each subsequent
partial satisfaction would reduce pro tanto5 2 the total judgment
amount; and when the plaintiff was fully compensated, he was
barred from proceeding further. 83
The question of contribution arose next. At common law, once a
conditioned by the notion of shared fault. The notion of the culpability of parties still persists
in our system of comparative negligence in the areas of subrogation and contribution, which
are seen as equitable doctrines. See Comment, Subrogation in Pennsylvania - Competing
Interests of Insurers and Insureds in Settlements with Third Party Tortfeasors, 56 TEMP. L.Q.
667 (1983). At common law, the culpability of a tortfeasor in trespass was akin to criminal
culpability and found its way into the theoretic basis for the rule against contributions. See
infra, text and accompanying notes 34-38.
27. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 48, at 330.
28. By choosing whom to sue, the tortfeasor could confer what was, in all material
aspects, an immunity on the tortfeasor he chose not to sue. Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS (1955), 12 U.L.A. at 60-61 (1975).
29. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937) and
Note, Settlement Devices with Joint Tortfeasors, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 762 (1973).
30. The Field Code was designed to help foster settlement of all issues in a single court
case. See Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE LI. 817, 818 (1924).
31. W. PROSSER- & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 48, at 330.
32. From the Latin "for as much as may be; as far as it goes." A payment which
decreases a money judgment by the amount of the payment. To be compared with pro rata,
which means according to a certain rate, percentage or proportion. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1100 & 1098 (5th ed. 1979).
33. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 48, at 331.
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defendant paid the judgment he had no right to proceed against any
of the other joint tortfeasors to obtain contribution from them for
their share of the loss. 3 ' This harsh rule against contribution among
joint tortfeasors apparently had its origin in intentional torts. It was
believed that since contribution was an equitable concept, the equitable rule of "clean hands" would protect the non-paying tortfeasor
from being hauled into court by an intentional tortfeasor who had
discharged the common obligation." In England, contribution was
denied only in cases where the wrongdoer's act was willful. This allowed for contribution in cases of vicarious liability, negligence, accident, mistake and other unintentional tortious acts. a6 In the United
States, the reason behind the "no contribution" rule37 was lost to
sight, and many American jurisdictions proceeded to apply a strict
"no contribution" rule monolithically in any case involving multiple
tortfeasors, whether an intentional or unintentional tort was
involved.3 8
Very few American jurisdictions departed from this unfair common law rule denying the right to contribution among all types of
tortfeasors. One of the few jurisdictions that chose not to adopt the
harsh "American Rule" was Pennsylvania. Before adopting its Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (PaCATA) in 1951," Pennsylva34. The basis for this rule was an equitable doctrine: that it is not the duty of the
courts to come to the aid of a wrongdoer. Contribution distributes the loss among tortfeasors
who are jointly or severally liable in tort by requiring each one to share the burden of the loss
when it is discharged by one tortfeasor, or when one tortfeasor pays more than his share of the
loss. It is an equitable right held by the paying tortfeasor and is considered to be inchoate,
ripening only if and when a joint tortfeasor pays more than his share of the common liability.
HEFT & HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 4A.10 (rev. ed.). See also Greenstone,
Spreading the Loss - Indemnity, Contribution, Comparative Negligence & Subrogation, 13
FORUM 266 (1977). Each share of joint liability under common law is a pro rata share, see
supra note 32. Under common law, a pro rata share does not take into account the relative
"blameworthyness" of the negligent actor, but is merely a formula whereby a party's share is
calculated by dividing the number of liable defendants by the amount of the liability. Thus,
each defendant is liable for an equal share, regardless of his degree of fault. HEr & HEFT,
supra, at § 4A.10.
CNA changed the rule of pro rata liability insofar as under comparative negligence the
pro rata shares are calculated in reference to the percentage of causal fault of the defendants.
See, Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp., 638 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1981).
35. See Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence - Merryweather v.Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898); Prosser, Joint Tortfeasors and Several
Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 425-26 (1937) and Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
36. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25 § 50, at 337.
37. The reason for the rule was the qualitative distinction between intentional and unintentional torts. See supra note 35.
38. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25 § 50, at 337.
39. PA. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-27
(Purdon 1982). Pennsylvania was one of the first jurisdictions to adopt the Uniform Act
promulgated in 1939.
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nia followed the "English" rule permitting contribution except in
cases of intentional conduct.40 The Pennsylvania Contribution Act
can therefore be seen as a codification and refinement of an already

existent common law right.
III.

Release and Settlement -

Common Law and the Contribution

Act
Release is the surrender of a cause of action. This can be done

either gratuitously or for "inadequate" consideration. 1 When the
only type of joint tort was the "pure" joint tort, it was logical that
release of one co-tortfeasor released all, since theoretically there existed only one cause of action against all wrongdoers, which was surrendered with the release. 2 But this practice of "release of one releases all," like the doctrine of no contribution among tortfeasors" s
and the rule that there be only one execution on a judgment,'
spread to the "concurrent" or "procedural" tort 5 where there was
no theoretical reason to support it.41 In fact, even when a release
instrument expressly stated that it should not have the effect of surrendering a plaintiff's cause of action against any other joint
7
tortfeasor, it might nonetheless have that very effect.4
40. See, e.g.., Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870) and Goldman
v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A.231 (1928). Goldman states that there are exceptions to the rule that there is no "contributorship" [sic] between joint tortfeasors. Id. at 358,
141 A. at 232. Citing 13 C.J. 829, Goldman attempts to define those areas in which a right to
contribution does not accrue as situations in which the underlying transaction was illegal or
fraudulent. The prime factor is, according to the Goldman court, whether the defendant knew
his action was wrongful at the time of the act. Id. at 361, 141 A. at 234.
Two other states, Wisconsin and Minnesota, joined Pennsylvania in relaxing the rule
against contribution among joint tortfeasors. See Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis.
392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13
(1926). It is interesting to note that aside from being among the progressives states on the
contribution issue, Wisconsin and Minnesota were also among the earliest jurisdictions to
adopt comparative negligence systems, in 1931 and 1969 respectively. See HEFT & HEFr,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 3.570, and 3.300 (Rev. ed.).
41. If a cause of action (chose in action) is released for adequate compensation and the
plaintiff is fully compensated for his injuries, then "satisfaction" rather than "release" has
occurred and no litigation against additional defendants can ensue. See Note, Settlement Devises with Joint Tortfeasors, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 7621 (1973).
42. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 49, at 332.
43. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 49, at 332. See Havighurst, The
Effect of a Settlement with One Co-Obligor upon the Obligations of the Others, 45 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1959).
47. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 49, at 332. The reason behind this
was that the written or oral provision allowing for non-release of remaining defendants was
considered "repugnant" to the legal operation of the instrument.
One commentator has summarized and rebutted the four reasons that have traditionally

91

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1986

Enterprising lawyers drafted various instruments in an effort to
circumvent the harsh "release of one releases all" rule. One of these
was the covenant-not-to-sue, a pre-trial devise whereby the plaintiff
agreed not to sue the covenanting tortfeasor. Many courts considered
a covenant-not-to-sue a release in any event, and gave it the same

effect as a normal release.' 8 Another devise designed to circumvent
the "release of one releases all" rule was the covenant-not-to-execute. This was an agreement entered into after trial had begun,
which effected a release of one party while retaining a cause of action against another. This was accomplished with an agreement by
the plaintiff not to execute on the judgment. It had the same effect
as a covenant-not-to-sue because the plaintiff could still recover on

the judgment from the party not taking the release.49
IV.

The Pennsylvania Contribution Act

In response to the problems posed by the harsh common law
rules relating to releases and contribution rights, in 1939, the Na-

tional Conference on Uniform State Laws promulgated The Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA). Pennsylvania
adopted the UCATA as its Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
been advanced for the "release of one releases all" doctrine. The first is that the construction
of the release instrument should be against the maker or releaser (the plaintiff). This reason is
weakened by the fact that it is the defendant who is generally the author of the instrument.
Second, it was thought that the claimant should be limited to one recovery. This fear may hold
true if the plaintiff settled with many multiple tortfeasors and thereby gained a double recov-'
ery. In reality some defendants are normally left in litigation, and various contribution acts
will reduce the amount recoverable by a plaintiff pro tanto. A third reason for the "release of
one releases all" rule was that courts complained about the problems of enforcing rights of
contribution after the settlement. It is perplexing that this rationale has been espoused even by
jurisdictions which deny contribution rights. See Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Boone, 85 So.2d
834 (Fla. 1956). Finally, the unitary nature of the obligation has been said to justify the rule
that the release of one released all. But this unitary nature really exists only in the cases of
"pure" joint torts. Note, supra note 41, at 767.
48. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25 § 49, at 334. Courts generally look at
the "intent" of the agreeing parties in construing the document. Even in a document entitled
"Covenant Not to Sue," a court can find that it is a release. See, e.g., Atlantic Coastline R.R.
v. Boone, 85 So.2d 834, 842 (Fla. 1956).
49. See Note, Settlement Devices With Joint Tortfeasors, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 762, 771
(1973); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779, 78182, nn. 21-22 (1978). Another salvo in the lawyer's battery of release devises is the "Mary
Carter Agreement." In that instrument a released defendant agrees to a maximum liability
which can fluctuate downward in inverse proportion to the size of plaintiff's recovery against
the non-settling defendants. The "Mary Carter Agreement", taking its name from Booth v.
Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967), can thus be considered a great-granddaughter of the covenant-not-to-execute. It is considered unlawful in many jurisdictions because of its potency for collusiveness in a trial in which the releasee will be present, in spite of
having taken a release. See Comment, Blending Mary Carter's Colors: A Tainted Covenant,
12 GONZ. L. REV. 266 (1977); Annot., 65 ALR 3d 602 (1975).
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(PaCATA) in 1951.0 Although Pennsylvania was more liberal than

most of its sister states in having already allowed for contribution, at
least in cases of unintentional torts,5 1 until the adoption of PaCATA
it still clung to the doctrine that the release of one tortfeasor re52
leased all.
50. PA. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-27
(Purdon 1982). Substantially a reenaction of July 19, 1951, P.L. 1130, §§ 1-8 (12 P.S. §§
2082-89). Reenacted 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27, 1978. Based on
UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939 Version) 12 U.L.A. 57-59 (1975). PaCATA
reads as follows:
§ 8321. Short title of subchapter
This subchapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act."
§ 8322. Definition
As used in this subchapter "joint tort-feasors" means two or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property,
whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.
§ 8323. Scope of subchapter
This subchapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
§ 8324. Right of contribution
(a) General rule.-The right of contribution exists among joint tort-feasors.
(b) Payment required.-A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability
or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
(c) Effect of settlement.-A joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement
with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint
tort-feasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the
settlement.
§ 8325. Effect of judgment
The recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tort-feasor.
§ 8326. Effect of release as to other tort-feasors
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or
after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so
provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of
the consideration paid for the release or in any amount of the consideration paid
for the release or in any amount of proportion by which the release provides that
the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.
§ 8327. Liability to make contribution as affected by release

A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor does not relieve him
from liability to make contribution to another tort-feasor to secure a money
judgment for contribution has accrued and provides for a reduction to the extent
of the pro rata share of the released tort-feasor of the injured person's damages
recoverable against all the other tort-feasors.
5 I. See supra text and accompanying note 40. Pennsylvania was one of six jurisdictions
that recognized the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors in their caselaw prior to
adopting UCATA. The others were the District of Columbia, Minnesota, Tennessee and Wisconsin. In Maine there was right to contribution from one who was vicariously liable, with
language which may have possibly indicated a recognition of a general right to contribution.
12 U.L.A. 60 (Commissioners' Prefatory Note 1955 Revision) [hereinafter cited as UCATA
COMMISSIONERS' NOTE (1955)1. In addition, a number of states adopted their own contribution
acts rather than opting for the 1939 Uniform Contribution Act. Some of these contribution
acts predated UCATA, but these were mainly limited to contribution between joint judgment
defendants. These states were Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
Texas, and West Virginia. UCATA COMMISSIONERS' NOTE (1955) at 59.
52. See, e.g., Peterson v. Wiggins, 230 Pa. 631, 79 A. 767 (1911); Koller v. Pennsylva-
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Pennsylvania was one of only eight jurisdictions to adopt the
1939 UCATA, 53 and it adopted it essentially verbatim.54 A close
look at the 1939 UCATA surprisingly reveals an optional provision
that allows for apportionment of losses according to relative degree
of fault, presaging Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Act by
almost forty years. 55 Pennsylvania declined to take this option and

adopted the rule of equal pro rata shares of liability for tortfeasors,
even those who possibly exhibited vastly different degrees of negligence. The pro rata system of apportioning loss equally regardless of

"fault" persisted in Pennsylvania until the adoption of the CNA in
1976.56 The basis for equal pro rata shares was the perceived inability of separating one indivisible injury into apportioned parts.57
PaCATA defines an interplay between loss sharing, contribunia Ry. Co., 351 Pa. 60, 40 A.2d 89 (1944).
53. The full roster was Arkansas (1941), Delaware (1949), Hawaii (1941), Maryland
(1941), New Mexico (1947), Pennsylvania (1951), Rhode Island (1940), and South Dakota
(1945). UCATA COMMISSIONERs' NOTE (1955) at 59.
54. Notwithstanding the Commissioners' comment to the contrary in the 1955 UCATA
which states that all adopting states, with the exception of Arkansas, Hawaii, and South Dakota, "made important changes in the Act which have defeated the whole idea of uniformity,"
id. at 59, the only difference between the Pennsylvania version and the 1939 UCATA is that
Pennsylvania chose not to include § 7 of the Uniform Act. Section 7 concerns procedure: third
party practice, amended complaints, counterclaims and cross-complaints, and motions practice.
Pennsylvania's PaCATA also omits various minor provisions such as § 8 "Constitutionality," §
9 "Uniformity of Interpretation," § 10 "Short Title," § II "Repeal," and § 12 "Time of
Taking Effect." In Pennsylvania at least, the Commissioners' worries in 1955 seem to have
been overexaggerated since all the substantive areas of the Contribution Act remained intact,
thereby not defeating the essential uniformity of the UCATA.
55. "When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render
inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribution, the
relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro
rata shares." UCATA § 2(4), 9 U.L.A. 235 (1957) (1939 version). The 1939 Commissioners'
Note adds the following:
The draftsmen of the Act feel that there is a very strong case to be made
for apportioning the common liability as among the tortfeasors when the evidence clearly indicates that one or more of the tortfeasors was much more at
fault than one or more of the other. At the same time they wish to point out that
each tortfeasor is still completely and fully liable toward the injured person.
Granted, however, that a contribution statute does effect some measure of justice
in distributing the common burden of liability equally among the tortfeasors, it
is apparent that some measure of injustice is done when a tortfeasor whose fault
was patently greater than another's can nevertheless shift to such other half of
the burden imposed on him by the injured person.
The apportionment device is intended to work as follows: If the evidence
indicates that there is a disproportion of fault as among the tortfeasors, the court
shall instruct the jury that if it finds the tortfeasors to have been negligent, they
shall also fix their relative degrees of fault. Thus if the court believes that an
apportionment of fault is inappropriate in a particular case none will be made.
1939 UCATA COMMISSIONERs' NOTE, 9 U.L.A. 236-7 (1957).
56. See Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp., 638 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1981).
57. When one injury was divisible, however, loss could be apportioned to each
tortfeasor on the basis of harm caused. See Lasprogata v. Quails, 263 Pa. Super. 174, 397
A.2d 803 (1979).
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tion, releases and settlements. It applies to joint tortfeasors only, defined as two or more persons "jointly or severally" liable in tort for
the same injury to persons or property "whether or not judgment has
been recovered against all or some of them." 58 The right of indem-

nity as it exists is not impaired by PaCATA.59 A right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors, 60 but that right does not arise
until a joint tortfeasor has either entirely discharged the common
liability or has at least paid more than his pro rata share of it."1
Section 8324(c) is notable because it has caused major interpre-

tative problems, not only in Pennsylvania but in other jurisdictions
which have adopted the 1939 version of the UCATA.62 It provides
that a joint tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff does not have the
right to contribution from other joint tortfeasors unless the remaining tortfeasors' liability to the injured party has been extinguished
58. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8322 (Purdon 1982) (formerly 12 P.S. § 2082). The
Act begs the question as to how a joint tortfeasor is defined because to state that a joint
tortfeasor is one who is jointly or severally liable in tort is to engage in circular reasoning.
Actually, joint tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable in tort because they are joint
tortfeasors, and not the other way around.
59. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8323 (Purdon 1982) (formerly 12 P.S. § 2087). The
classic differentiation between indemnity and contribution is that indemnity is an order, arising
from contract or by operation of law, requiring another to completely reimburse one who has
discharged a common or joint liability. Contribution requires a party to pay only a proportionate share of the common liability once the other party has discharged the joint liability. See
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951); Globe Indem. Co. v. Agway, Inc., 456 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1972).
Modern systems of comparative negligence have begun to delineate a new doctrine of
"comparative indemnity" in order to compare liability in personal injury cases where the characters of the fault are different. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20
Cal.3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071
(Okla. 1978); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.
1978); and Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972).
60. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324(a) (Purdon 1982). Section 8324(a), (b) and (c)
were formerly 12 P.S. § 2083. The PaCATA leaves open the question of a possibility for
contribution even if the tort was an intentional one. The 1955 version of UCATA specifically
foreclosed such an application. The 1955 UCATA provides that "[t]here is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally [wilfully or wantonly] caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." UCATA § I(c) (1955).
61. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324(b) (Purdon 1982). Prior to such payment the
right is inchoate and can only ripen by virtue of a judgment. Note the inherent conflict between that section and § 8324(c) which states that the right to contribution only ripens if a
settlement extinguishes the liability of the non-settling tortfeasors. This need for extinguishment is not to be taken literally. See infra text and accompanying notes 67-75 for the discussion of the construction of the word "extinguish" in the Mong and Daugherty precedents.
62. The offending provision occurs in both the 1939 and the 1955 versions; as § 2(3) of
the 1939 Act and as § I(d) of the 1955 Act. See Comment, Another Look At Strict Liability:
The Effect on Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 79 DiCK. L. REV. 125 (1974); Note, Joint
Tortfeasors - Alleged Joint Tortfeasor Who Settles With Plaintiff in Return for Joint
Tortfeasor's Release Not Entitled to Contribution When all Other Alleged Joint Tortfeasors
Settle with Plaintiff, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 137 (1976).
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by the settlement.8 Although the drafters of the act avowedly tried
to encourage settlements,6 4 interpreted literally, this provision would
actually discourage settlements since a settler would not know that
he had actually completely extinguished the remaining liability until
after the trial took place and liability was set. A settler could not
incorrectly guess his liability to be an amount between what would
eventually be determined as his pro rata share and the full judgment
owed by all tortfeasors and still have his inchoate right to contribution arise. Under that circumstance, according to the plain language
of the section, he could receive no contribution whatsoever from the
other tortfeasors whose liabilities are lessened. Only by paying the
full judgment or by overestimating the liability and paying more
than the full judgment would the settler be entitled to reimbursement for the nonsettler's full pro rata share.
This literal interpretation of section 8324(c) would be absurd
since one of the reasons for settlement is to buy peace of mind, and
to do so by paying an amount hopefully less than the amount of the
judgment.65 PaCATA thus facially penalizes a settler by not allowing him contribution rights in the very cases in which he would
be likely to settle, and taken literally, would have a chilling effect on
out-of-court settlements. 6
63. 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324(c) (Purdon 1982).
64. According to the Commissioners' Comment to the 1955 UCATA, both this section
(§ 2(3) of the 1939 act), and its counterpart (§ I(d) of the 1955 Act) reflect a policy of
encouraging settlements because they allow a tortfeasor to remove himself from the action by
settling and buying his peace for less than the full liability. 12 U.L.A. 65. Viewing the section
as a remedy to the common law rule that a release of one party released all, it could be seen as
encouraging settlements from a plaintiff's point of view. However, the drafters did not seem to
realize the problems it would cause from a defendant's point of view.
65. In fact, one hopefully tries to settle for less than even the settler's own pro rata
share of the judgment.
66. This researcher has not been able to find a satisfactory explanation for the anomaly
posed by the choice of language in § 8324(c). Neither the Commissioners' Notes to the 1939
Act nor the Commissioners' Notes to the 1955 Act shed light on this aberration. The 1955
Commissioners' Comment cites the encouragement of settlements as the policy behind this
section (see supra discussion at note 64). The 1939 Commissioners' Note indicates that the
drafters were concerned with protecting the non-settling tortfeasors from the settler who took a
covenant-not-to-sue. In that case the settler could potentially ask for contribution even though
he had purchased only his own immunity by taking the covenant-not-to-sue and had done
nothing to reduce the liability of his fellow defendants.
In such a case there is no reason to permit contribution since the settling
tortfeasor has removed no burden common to all or more than one of the
tortfeasors. Presumably, under this Section, if a tortfeasor, by a settlement,
secures the release of one of several tortfeasors other than himself, he may at
least request contribution from that tortfeasor.
UCATA § 2, at 236 (1957).
The Commissioners, however, still begged the question of why a tortfeasor who settled
and only partially extinguished the remaining tortfeasor's liability had no right to contribution,
whereas the tortfeasor who completely extinguished (a rare occurrence which would only hap-
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7 the Pennsylvania Superior Court was
In Mong v. Hershberger,6
faced with the very problem posed by the wording of section 8324(c)
of PaCATA. Mong, a settler, had paid more than his pro rata share
but less than the full amount of the liability. He therefore did not
completely "extinguish" the liability of the other tortfeasor, Hershberger. Consequently, it appeared that Mong did not have contribu-

tion rights against Hershberger, 8 and in the underlying action,

6 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reDaugherty v. Hershberger,
duced the verdicts for each of the multiple plaintiffs by the amount
Mong had paid in his settlement so that Hershberger paid much less
than his pro rata share of the verdicts.7 0

In Mong the Pennsylvania Superior Court had a chance to expound upon the meaning of "extinguish" in section 8324(c). In one
linguistic coup, the court declared that "extinguish" really did not
mean total and complete elimination. It could also mean to "cause to
die out."'' T Thus Mong's contribution rights were not foreclosed.
pen by mistake) did have such a right. Possibly the provision was meant to force a settling
defendant to settle
at a high enough level
to fully
compensate the plaintiff.
Or perhaps itwas
meant to encourage the settler to take a general release whereby plaintiff releases all claims
against all the non-released defendants. See Frank v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 522 F.2d 321,
328 (3d Cir. 1975). In Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709
(1978) the claim was for serious injury of a plaintiff who had overcome Pennsylvania's longstanding sovereign immunity rule. On remand hiscase was dismissed because he had taken a
general release in return fora $3,000 settlement. Commonwealth v. Mayle, 76 Pa. Commw.
277, 463 A.2d 1239 (1983).
67. 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962).
68. Prior to judgment, Mong settled with plaintiffs
taking a pro rata release which
reduced the plaintiffs'
claims against the other defendants by Mong's pro rata share. Mong's
pro rata share was 50% since there were a total
of two tortfeasors. In the underlying action,
Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956), the judgment against Hershberger had not been completely extinguished by Mong's settlement even though the settlement
was, at $13,500, more than the amount of the verdict. This was because many plaintiffs
were
involved inthe accident and the settlement was allocated to each plaintiff
separately by name
and amount, leaving several victims undercompensated, and several overcompensated. Jury
awards left
unsatisfied by Mong's settlement totaled $1,839.26.
69. 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
70. The court did not take into account the extra Mong had paid on some of the verdicts. The plaintiffs in Daugherty were asking for a recovery from Hershberger of one-half the
entire verdict (Hershberger's pro rata share), notwithstanding the settlement with Mong.
Justice Musmanno's dissent to Daugherty, id. at 375, 126 A.2d at 734 (Musmanno J.
dissenting), is one of the most pungent of his opinions. Afficianados of Musmannia will revel in
such statements as: "He [Hershberger who now must pay only $1,839.26 of the judgment due
to Mong's settlement] wants to travel on a train for which he purchased no ticket, he seeks to
mount a horse which he did not feed, he desires to ride on a merry-go-round which, so far as
he was concerned, might never have been built." Id. at 377, 126 A.2d at 735. But as eloquent
and thoughtful as Justice Musmanno was, he was not prescient. He never expected that Mong
would be allowed contribution from Hershberger for at least some of Mong's overpayment in
the subsequent contribution action. See Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d
427 (1962).
71.
Examining the Act of 1951 with these principles in mind, we are led to the
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Section 8325 of PaCATA reverses the common law rule that

recovering a judgment against one joint tortfeasor releases all the
others from judgment.7 2 Section 8326 determines the effect of a release on the liability of the other tortfeasors. At common law, the
release of one tortfeasor released all others from liability.7.The PaCATA allows for a release that does not necessarily discharge the
other tortfeasors from liability, but rather, reduces the claim against
the others by the amount paid for the release or by any amount
agreed to in the release if it is greater than the amount paid. 74
Although Section 8326 is seemingly clear on its face, the
Daugherty court also struggled to interpret it. 75 The plaintiff,
Daugherty, wanted the non-settler, Hershberger, to pay his whole
pro rata share of the judgment even though the settler, Mong, had

given consideration for the release in an amount much greater than
Mong's pro rata share. Daugherty believed that since Mong had

signed a pro rata release, the verdict should only be reduced by the
pro rata amount, or one half.7 ' The plain meaning of the provision of
section 8326 prevailed,77 however, and Daugherty was able to collect
only the amounts on each verdict which were not covered by Mong's
conclusion that to deprive appellant of his right to contribution from appellee
would be unreasonable and absurd, as well as contrary to the intent of the
Legislature.
Section 2 [§ 8324] and section 4 [§ 8326] recognize the right to contribution when one pays more than his share; and although the third provision of
section 2, when given a strict interpretation might lead to the conclusion that in
cases of settlement, unless there is a complete extinguishment of the claims
against the other tortfeasor, the right of contribution does not exist. We do not
believe the Legislature intended such a strict meaning. The verb extinguish does
not necessarily mean an abrupt or complete elimination of fire, or in law, of
rights or claims. It may also mean a gradual or limited result. It has various
meanings: 'to cause to die out'; 'to quench, to wet, moisten'; 'to nullify'; 'to
avoid, as by payment, setoff, . . . merger of an interest in a greater one'; 'suppress'. Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged).
Therefore, we have no difficulty in concluding that the releases secured by
Mong satisfied the third provision of section 2 [§ 8324(c)] as to all the claims,
regardless of whether they were completely or only partially extinguished; and
that Mong has the right of contribution from Hershberger.
Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. at 72-73, 186 A.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
72. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8325 (Purdon 1982) (formerly 12 P.S. § 2084).
73. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
74. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982) (formerly 12 P.S. § 2085). See
Griffith, The Meaning and Significance of Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 322 (1960); Note, supra note 62.
75. Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
76. A pro rata release reduced Hershberger's liability by Mong's pro rata share.
Daugherty's argument entailed the following distribution: he would receive the settlement of
$13,500 plus one half the verdict of $11,720.99 ($5,860.50) for a total of $19,360.50.
77. Section 8326 provides that if the settlement is greater than the settler's pro rata
share, the claim is to be reduced by the amount of consideration paid for the release. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982).
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settlement. With the Mong gloss on PaCATA, a settler has a right

to contribution against a non-settler if the settler pays more than his
pro rata share of the judgment, even if he has not completely extinguished the underlying liability.
Section 8327 of PaCATA is the flip side of Mong. It allows a
non-settling tortfeasor to retain contribution rights against the settling tortfeasor. There is, however, one very important exception to
this rule. If the settling defendant takes a pro rata release, thereby
reducing the non-settler's liability by the settler's pro rata share,7 the
settler will be free from any subsequent claim for contribution. 1
V.

Who Is a "Joint Tortfeasor"?

According to section 8321 of PaCATA, a party must be a "joint
tortfeasor" for the Act to apply to him. 7 9 If a party settles before

joint tortfeasor status is determined, according to PaCATA his settlement payment may be considered that of a "volunteer," and will
not reduce the judgment against the remaining tortfeasors.80 The

question of how to handle the out-of-court settlement within PaCATA thus arises. If a party's fault has not been determined at
trial, is he still a "joint tortfeasor" under the Act? Under what conditions should the settlement of such a party reduce the amount of
the judgment collectible among any remaining defendants? When

should his settlement be considered that of "volunteer?" What if
these considerations trigger a double recovery by the plaintiff? Must
a settler remain as a party in the lawsuit until his status is determined, or are there other methods that can confer joint tortfeasor
status with legal certainty? The answers to these and other related
78. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1982). Not all releases need be pro rata
releases. The pro rata release can be worse from the point of view of the plaintiff if he has
settled "too lightly." For example, A sues B & C. Damages are $100,000. B settles for
$20,000 taking a pro rata release. A can now only recover $50,000 from C, and according to §
8327, C does not have contribution rights against B. Here, under § 8326, the "proportion by
which the release provides that the total claim be released" is 50% or a pro rata share and it is
greater than the consideration paid ($20,000). Therefore the claim of $100,000 is reduced by
$50,000 rather than $20,000.
79. See, e.g., "Short Title," 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8321 (Purdon 1982). "This
subchapter shall be known . . . as the 'Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act;'" see
also, language in sections 8324, 8325, 8326, 8327.
80. See Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956); Koller v. Pennsylvania R.
Co,. 351 Pa. 60, 63, 40 A.2d 89, 90 (1944). See also Slaughter v. Pennsylvania X-Ray Corp.,
638 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1981); Castillo v. Roger Construction Co., 560 F.2d 1146, 1152
(3d Cir. 1977). Note, Joint Torifeasors, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1957) states that Pennsylvania is one of a handful of jurisdictions to hold that a payment for a release by a non-joint
tortfeasor did not reduce the judgment. Anomalously, however, a putative joint tortfeasor who
fully settles a claim is not considered a volunteer. Harger v. Caputo, 420 Pa. 528, 532-33, 218
A.2d 108, 111-12 (1966).
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questions are found in PaCATA-related case law.
Adjudication of joint tortfeasor status can be accomplished in
three ways. The first and most direct way is to have the releasee's
status determined in a lawsuit to which he is a party. One reason a
party may wish to settle, however, is to avoid the expense and
trouble of participating in a lawsuit. In Davis v. Miller,81 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that if there is a party who could "benefit" from the presence of the settler at trial, the settler would be
required to attend. This rule became known as the "benefit" rule.
This situation may arise where a settler has taken a release which
does not concede joint tortfeasor status, since the non-settler would
then not get the benefit of the payment of the "volunteer".
The second way in which joint tortfeasor status can be determined is by concession. A settling party may concede joint tortfeasor
status in the release instrument. For example, in Griffin v. United
States82 a settling party took a "joint tortfeasor" release which conceded liability and stated that the judgment would be reduced by its
pro rata share of the liability. Since the settler had conceded its joint
tortfeasor status, the opposing party would receive no "benefit" from
forcing the settler to remain at trial. It was said in Griffin that the
wording of the release given by plaintiff "waived" the "benefit"
rule.83
Finally, joint tortfeasor status can be determined by prior litigation or by some other method which confers joint tortfeasor status
reliably and clearly from the circumstances under which a prior release was given. 84 One example is where liability is established in a
separate contribution suit.86
VI.

Settlements Under the Contribution Act
According to Davis, if a settler is not a joint tortfeasor, his pay-

81. 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956). The settling co-defendant in Davis had been
given a "general" release but nonetheless she was required to be present at trial since it would
benefit Miller, the other defendant, to have her joint tortfeasor status adjudicated. If she were
determined to have been a joint tortfeasor, the plaintiffs would have been able to recover only
Miller's pro rata share of the judgment, or one-half.
82. 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 1072.
84. Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1985), citing Mazer v.
Security Insurance Group, 507 F.2d 1338, 1342 (3d Cir. 1975).
85. See, e.g., Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961). Swartz was an
action for contribution by one settling tortfeasor against another. Neither was adjudicated
liable to the plaintiff. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that they would still have
"their day in court with full opportunity to defend against liability .
Id. at 226, 169
A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original).
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ment does not reduce the plaintiff's judgment against a non-settling

tortfcasor.86 This "volunteer" rule is characterized as plaintiff favoring because it makes it possible for a plaintiff to receive a double
recovery. The issue of double recovery was discussed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Rocco v. Johns-

Manville Corp.87 Rocco overturned a lower court decision which had
allowed a verdict to be reduced by the "volunteer" payment of the
settlers in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.88 In
reaching the conclusion that under these circumstances a plaintiff's
"unjust enrichment" is legally unavoidable, the Rocco court cited
the rule of Davis and the joint tortfeasor language of the PaCATA
as demanding this outcome.8 9
Justice Musmanno's concern in Daugherty v. Hershbergerthat
the non-settler would reap the benefit of an overpayment by the settler was unjustified in cases where the settler has conceded his joint

tortfeasor status and therefore is not a volunteer. 90 The over-paying
settler in Mong was subsequently allowed a contribution action
against the non-settler. 91 Musmanno's criticisms of the poor settle-

ment environment created by a system in which a plaintiff has no
hopes for a possible double recovery are well taken.9" The Daugherty/Mong precedents allowing no double recovery in conjunction
with PaCATA have produced a chilling effect on out-of-court settle-

ments. A plaintiff can only stand to lose part of a recovery by settling with a defendant and there is only that slight possibility of
double recovery in cases of "volunteer" payments.98
Criticism of the 1939 UCATA's prohibitive effects on settlements led to promulgation of the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (1955 UCATA). 9 ' The major change in the 1955

version is that any release given in good faith to a tortfeasor reduces
86. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956).
87. 754 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 115.
89. "We have read Davis v. Miller as establishing the principle that if the settling
party is not a tortfeasor, his payment is that of a volunteer and does not support a claim for
contribution or pro rata reduction." Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
90. 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956). " . . . any pipe of peace they smoke may be
shattered in their mouths by a court's order as this one has done.
... Id. at 382, 126 A.2d
at 737. (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
91. Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962).
92. "A plaintiff would use very poor judgment in settling because he cannot possibly
get more than what the jury will give him eventually, and takes a chance of getting even less
by settling." Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 381, 126 A.2d at 737. (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
93. See supra text and accompanying notes 79-86.
94. UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975) (1955 version).
Pennsylvania never abandoned its PaCATA which is based on the 1939 UCATA.
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the claim against the others by the amount of consideration paid. 95
In addition, it discharges that releasee "from any liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor."" In contrast, under the 1939
UCATA and the PaCATA, a party who settled for a "light" amount
and did not take a pro rata release was potentially liable to a non-

7
settler who paid for more than his pro rata share.
The 1955 UCATA, then, wildly encourages parties to settle
quickly and lightly because once they do settle and "get out," the
non-settler cannot enforce contribution rights against them. Under
the 1955 Act, slow settlers can be left to bear the burden of most of
the verdict." 8
There has been much litigation over the 1955 UCATA, however, regarding the question as to what constitutes a release made in
99

"good faith."

The rule of the 1955 UCATA that prevents non-settling defendants from obtaining contribution from the settler or settlers (the "settlement bar" rule), although first seeming to have the
potential for dramatically increasing settlements, began to have a
secondary chilling effect. Settlers became afraid they would be
forced to return to court to litigate the good faith issue, and they
95. "[T]o the extent of any amount stipulated by the release ... or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it,
which ever is the greater." Id. at § 4(a); 12 U.L.A. at 98 (1975).
This part of the 1955 UCATA is identical to § 8326 (PaCATA).
96. UCATA § 4(b) at 98 (emphasis added).
97. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1982). A release does not relieve the
settler from a liability to make contribution unless the release provides for a reduction in the
damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors to the extent of the pro rata share of
such release. In other words, a non-settler cannot get "stuck" under the 1939 Act as he can
under the 1955 Act.
98. In fact, possibly because of the dramatic changes in settlement dynamics, only
eleven states to date have adopted the 1955 version. 12 U.L.A. at 57, 62. Id. at 64 (West
Supp. 1985). See Comment, Comparative Contribution, 14 J. MAR. 173 (1980); McNichols,
Complexities of Oklahoma's Proportionate Several Liability Doctrine of Comparative Negligence - Is Products Liability Next?, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1982); Comment, Comparative
Negligence, Multiple Parties and Settlements, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1264 (1977); Kaplan, From
Contribution to Good Faith Settlements: Equity Where Are You?, 49 JAL 771 (1984).
99. For literature on the subject of "'good faith", see, e.g., Kissel, Developments in
Third-Party Practice - Contribution and Indemnity, 71 ILL. B.J. 654 (1983). Kissel discusses
the relevant factors in making the "good faith" determination: "[T]he court could consider the
risk of victory or defeat, the risk of a high or low verdict, the unknown strengths or weaknesses
of the opponent's case, the inexact appraisal as to the elements of danger, the defendant's
solvency and the amount of insurance coverage." Id. at 660. California is one of the states that
adopted the 1955 UCATA with its "good faith" standard. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6
(West Supp. 1986). See also Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 805, 173
Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (Ct. App. 1981), which states that a settlement may exhibit bad faith if it is
unreasonably low. The term "unreasonably cheap settlement" was first used in River Garden
Frams, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App.3d 986, 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 505 (Ct. App.
1972). But if the "unreasonably cheap" settlement shows no sign of tortious bad faith, then
the fact that it was "cheap" standing alone will not be fatal. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App.3d at
810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. There must be a specific bad-faith intent such as collusion to defeat
the release. Id. at 805, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
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became reluctant to take a release.' 00
VII.

Workers' Compensation: The "Immune" Tortfeasor

Many of the cases involving joint tortfeasors have arisen in the
context of accidents in the workplace involving the joint fault of the
employer and a third party tortfeasor. Pennsylvania's workers' compensation system has effected fundamental changes in common law
relationships among such parties and consequently has altered the

operation of Pennsylvania's contribution act (PaCATA). Additionally, the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) was subject to major

reinterpretation in its loss allocation scheme two times: with the
adoption of the 1974 amendments and with the adoption of the
Comparative Negligence Act (CNA) in 1976. This section briefly
traces how loss allocation is handled with respect to a statutorily immune employer, a third party tortfeasor and an injured plaintiff.
As originally enacted in 1915, Pennsylvania's workers' compensation system was optional. If both the employer and employee accepted the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act, they could effect a fundamental change in their common law relationship. The

employer would relinquish its common law defenses. 101 In return, the
WCA would immunize the employer from unlimited tort liability,
and the employer would be liable for a statutorily established payment. 10 2 The system approximates a "no fault" system in that any
fault on the part of either the employer or the employee is irrelevant
to the availability of compensation. 10 3
A difficult situation arises when a third party is responsible for
all or part of the worker's workplace injury. Does the third party
have any contribution rights against an employer? 0 4 Does it make a
100. See Justice Clark's dissent in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20
Cal.3d 578, 610 n. 2,578 P.2d 899, 920 n. 2, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 203 n. 2, (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("slightly negligent" defendant who does not wish to settle can be "held up" under
the 1955 UCATA for more than his fair share by a relatively insolvent, highly culpable, but
eager-to-settle defendant).
101. See Ryden v. Johns-Manville Prods., 518 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
The common law defenses were the "unholy trinity" of contributory negligence, assumption of
risk and the fellow servant rule. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 80, at 57576. The fellow servant rule was a common law doctrine whereby the employer was not liable
for a worker's injuries if they were caused solely by the negligence of a co-worker. The rule
was designed to help promote safety in the workplace by putting peer pressure on workers to
reduce injuries. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 80, at 571.
102. See Ryden v. Johns-Manville Products, 518 F. Supp. 311, 313-14.
103. W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 25, § 80, at 573. The authors characterize workers' compensation as a form of strict liability.
104. As stated in Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959), it would be
inequitable to impose common law liability in the form of full contribution rights on the part
of a third party tortfeasor as against the employer. "To do so would deprive [the employer] of
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difference whether or not the employer was free from fault? Does an

employer have any contribution rights or statutory lien against a
third party tortfeasor for all or part of its statutory payment? Is a
statutorily immune employer a "joint tortfeasor" in resolving contribution rights under the PaCATA or a "defendant" under CNA?
Answers to these question are found in WCA-related case law.
An influential rule for resolving loss allocation developed in
Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of CNA and the 1974 amendments to the WCA. It became known as the "Pennsylvania Rule"
throughout the country.10 5 This rule allowed a third party tortfeasor
to recover contribution from a negligent employer up to the amount
of workers' compensation the employer had paid or was liable for.106
On the other hand, a faultless compensation employer had10 what
7
amounted to a first lien on any verdict against a third party.
The "Pennsylvania Rule" effected a fair allocation of loss between the negligent parties involved in an accident in the workplace.
A third party tortfeasor was allowed "contribution" from the employer whose negligence had contributed to the accident, even
though the employer was theoretically not "liable in tort."10 8 The
his property by legislative fiat." Id. at 458, 155 A.2d at 838 (1959).
105. See Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review 1980 - XI Workers' Compensation, 54
TEMP L.Q. 718, 727-28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Workers' Compensation]. See, e.g., Lamberton v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 670 (1977), "[Old Pennsylvania
rule" permitting a limited right of contribution to a third party was hailed as "the solution
• . . most consistent with fairness ....
" Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689 (1977). See Larson,
Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV.
351 (1970). Larson, Third-Party's Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer,
1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 491 (1982). The "action over" in the titles of these articles is not a
misprint; it refers to the liability "over" the workers' compensation payment. See Tsarnas v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 518, 412 A.2d 1094, 1096 (1980).
106. Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 192, 14 A.2d 105, III (1940). See also Workers'
Compensation, supra note 105.
107. The blameless employers' rights were labeled subrogation rights rather than contribution rights. The essential nature of these rights was, however, really that of contribution
against the third party tortfeasor. They were called "subrogation" rights because the employer, if fault free, could subrogate to the right of the employee's third party tort recovery. In
that way it recouped the statutory payment that it made to the employee. A negligent employer was barred from asserting its subrogation rights due to a judicial gloss placed on the
WCA prior to the 1974 amendments. See, e.g., Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836
(1959); Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956); Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 288 Pa.
85, 135 A. 858 (1927); Conrad v. Aero-Mayflower Transit Co., 152 Pa. Super. 477, 33 A.2d
91 (1943); Stevenson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 73 Pitts. 78, 6 Pa. D. & C. 564 (1924);
Myers v. Philadelphia Daily News, 168 Pa. Super. 561, 79 A.2d 787 (1951). The subrogation
statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Purdon Supp. 1985), reads in pertinent part: "Where
the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of a third party,
the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe .... " Since the employer in
most cases had already paid benefits to the employee, that right would normally take the form
of being subrogated to the employee's tort recovery by the amount of compensation benefits
received.
108. In Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959), a third party tortfeasor
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non-negligent employer received "contribution" from the third party

tortfeasor to the extent of its statutory liability. The plaintiff did not
receive the potential double recovery that could result if he received

both the workers' compensation payment and the full tort award. 10 9
The "Pennsylvania Rule" also had a secondary effect. It created
an economic scheme which promoted safety in the workplace. Since
the employer's right of subrogation was linked to its lack of fault, it
had the financial incentive to take responsible actions to reduce the

probability of accidents."10 Systems which do not condition an employer's right to subrogation on its relative freedom from fault create

little incentive to create a safe environment.'
In 1972 the Pennsylvania Legislature began a massive overhaul
of its workers' compensation law. In 1974, WCA was amended. Section 303(b) of WCA"12 now provides that an employer will not be
liable to a third party for "damages, contribution, or indemnity."' 113
The new amendment was interpreted as creating a statutory exception to the "general right of contribution among tortfeasors."" 4 The
amendment had a huge effect on loss allocation in the workers' compensation system. Under the "Pennsylvania Rule" the workers' com-

pensation system co-existed with the PaCATA, allowing for "contribution" between the employer and the third party tortfeasor even
unsuccessfully argued that the PaCATA gave him a right of contribution beyond the limited
right of contribution the Maio holding gave him. 397 Pa. at 459-61, 155 A.2d at 838-40. The
problem with such a result is that the workers' compensation employer could be compelled into
contributing an amount towards a plaintiff's verdict in excess of its statutory obligation merely
because a third party's negligence added to its own negligence. See Elston v. Industrial Lift
Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 101-02, 103 n.3, 216 A.2d 318, 320 and 320 n. 3 (1966).
109. See, e.g., Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318.
110. Davis, The Interaction of Workers' Compensation and Products Liability, 15 Trial
31, 32 (1979). See also Workers' Compensation, supra note 105, at 731-32, n. 81.
Ill. See Hearings on the Implications and Proposed Amendments to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 Before the Select Subcommittee on Labor (July 1972) [hereinafter cited as National Commission Report]. The National Commission Report articulated
a safety interest as one of five major objectives that should be promoted by any workers'
compensation system. Id. at 15. It observed that the allocation of costs of work-related injuries
on the basis of fault provided an economic incentive for safety purposes. Id. at 22-23.
112. Section 303(b), as amended 1974, Dec. 5, P.L. 782, No. 263 § 6, codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
113. Section 303(b) provides that contribution or indemnity shall not be barred if expressly provided for in a written contract between the employer and the third party. But the
availability of a possible contract to effectuate contribution or indemnity rights is largely an
empty promise, since more often than not the third party and the employer will be strangers to
one another. If they are not, there is still the likelihood of unequal bargaining power between
them, the statutory employer generally having much more bargaining leverage. See Tsarnas v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 262 Pa. Super. 417, 442, 396 A.2d 1241, 1253 (1978) (Spaeth,
J., dissenting).
114. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. at 518, 412 A.2d at 1096
(1980).
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though the employer was technically not a "tortfeasor."' ' 5
Section 303(b) was drafted in response to the economic strain
on the workers' compensation system caused by a dramatic increase
in compensation benefits paid to employees." 6 The Pennsylvania
Legislature took note of the recommendations promulgated by the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws addressing the issue of negligence suits against third party tortfeasors.
The Commission recommended that workers' compensation benefits
be the "exclusive liability" of the employer when a worker is injured.11 It also recommended that suits by employees against negligent third parties by permitted." 8 Both of these recommendations
were consistent with Pennsylvania practice under WCA prior to the
1974 amendments and the "Pennsylvania Rule." After the amendment to section 303(b) was passed, a new series of workers' compensation cases, citing these recommendations as "proof" for their holdings, took away the third party tortfeasor's right to reduce its verdict
by the statutory liability of a negligent workers' compensation employer." 9 The equitable era of "limited load sharing" that had formerly taken place under the "Pennsylvania Rule" finally ended.
According to section 303(b) as amended, a third party who is
sued may not join the employer as an additional defendant, nor may
he seek contribution from the employer, even if the employer is
largely responsible for causing the injury. 20 The third party always
pays the entire recovery. The subrogation statute of WCA, however,
did not significantly change.' It still allows an employer to recoup
from the third party the benefits paid out for the benefit of the employee. Under the section as amended, however, even if the employer
had been negligent, it was entitled to subrogation if a third party
115. Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 101-02, 216 A.2d 318, 320 (1966).
116. The average payment rose from $60 per week to $187 per week. See Hefferin v.
Stempkowski, 247 Pa. Super. 368, 369, 372 A,2d 869, 870 (1977).
117. National Commission Report, supra note Ill, at Recommendation 2.18.
118. Id. at Recommendation 2.19.
119. See Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 262 Pa. Super. at 439 n. 2, 396 A.2d
at 1252 n. 2 (Spaeth, J., dissenting). There was no reason based on the text of the National
Commission Report for the Pennsylvania Legislature to have come up with the harsh result
that it did. The Report did not intimate that third party tortfeasors should not have recourse
against employers even to the limited extent of having their verdicts lessened by the amount
already paid in compensation benefits. The new windfall for the employer goes far beyond the
immunities that Recommendations 2.18 and 2.19 suggest.
120. See, e.g., Jones v. Carborundum Co., 515 F. Supp. 559, 562-3 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Purdon 1985 Supp). Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa.
Super, I10, 114 n.7, 390 A.2d 271, 273 n.7 (1978). See also Hefferin v. Stempkowski, 247 Pa.
Super. 366, 372 A.2d 869 (1977), which reaffirmed Arnold. Hefferin states that the employer
still has the right to subrogate. Id. at 368-69, 372 A.2d at 871.
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tortfeasor was involved. 22 The result was very one-sided and was
aptly characterized by one court as "too absolute a victory for the
employer."' 23 The result seemed so unfair that some members of the
judiciary believed that it was too bad of a construction of WCA to
124
be true.
In the supreme court decision Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., section 303(b) of the WCA finally withstood a constitutional challenge. 2 5 The provision was attacked as denying third parties access to the courts to litigate claims for contribution and indemnity against negligent but statutorily immune employers. 26

Justice Larsen wrote a brief concurrence to Tsarnas in which he
joined with the majority opinion on the condition that the employer's
right to subrogation would be contingent on its freedom from
122. Farage & McDaid, Annual Survey of Pennsylvania Legal Developments - Part I.
Tort Law, 49 PA, B. ASS'N Q. 415 (1978). "Surely, this must be the only area of the law
wherein a culpable defendant not only is immune from suit . . . but also has the affirmative
right via the vehicle of subrogation to be made whole for the loss suffered as a result of his
own fault." ld at 417.
Section 303(b) is said to have "obliterated" any cause of action against the employer
other than an action for compensation benefits. This means any adjudication of liability on the
part of the employer is foreclosed. See Bell v. Koppers Co., Inc., 481 Pa. 454, 392 A.2d 1380
(1978); Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa. Super. 110, 390 A.2d 271 (1978).
123. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 523, 412 A.2d 1094, 1099
(1980).
124. See Judge Spaeth's opinion in Tsarnas, 262 Pa. Super. at 433-443, 396 A.2d at
1249-54. See also Spaeth's concurring and dissenting opinion in Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa.
Super. 110, 390 A.2d 271. In Arnold, Spaeth describes how the new case law affected three
possible scenarios. In the first, an employee is injured at the worksite and a third party is
totally at fault. In that case the result is just since the party whose fault caused the injury will
bear the full burden. In scenario number two, the employer is totally at fault. Again, there is
no injustice because the party at fault, the employer in this case, will be liable for the injury. It
is scenario three that poses the problem of fairness. Both the employer and third party are
equally negligent. Under the case law interpreting section 303(b), the third party bears the
entire judgment. Spaeth states that under Hefferin the employer may not be joined as an
additional defendant, but may still subrogate to the right of the employee's third party tort
recovery. Id. at 115-17, 390 A.2d at 273-74. "[T]he employer will ... in the end pay nothing
despite having been at fault." Id. at 118, 390 A.2d at 274.
125. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980).
126. The third party tortfeasor unsuccessfully argued a violation of Article 3, Section 18
of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibiting the General Assembly from limiting the amount
recoverable for injuries by, in effect, placing a zero limit on the amount a third party can
recover from an employer. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18 (Purdon 1969). It also alleged violations
of Article I Section I I which guarantees access to court to litigate claims, PA. CONST. art. I, §
I1 (Purdon 1969), and attempted an equal protection challenge by claiming "unreasonable
and arbitrary" classifications which offend the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I. In its opinion, the supreme court relied on analo-

gies to the case law which developed in conjunction with the No

FAULT VEHICLE INSURANCE

1974 Pa. Laws 489, No. 176, 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq., and sustained the constitutionality of § 303(b). See Tsarnas, 262 Pa. Super. at 422-24, 396 A.2d at 1243-45. Note that
although both Tsarnas decisions were decided after the Comparative Negligence Act was
passed, the CNA was not implicated since the underlying accident took place prior to its
enactment.
ACT,
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fault.12 7 Since the Tsarnas holding concerned only the constitutional-

ity of section 303(b), the narrow issue of whether the employer's
right to subrogate remains unimpaired if it was partially at fault was
still open to question. 128
VIII.

Worker's Compensation Act and Comparative Negligence

The next major attack on the loss allocation scheme occurred
with the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA) in
1976.129 A threshold argument, made by those who wished to over-

turn the rule immunizing the workers' compensation employer from
liability when a third party tortfeasor was involved, was offered:
How could the Comparative Negligence Act be construed as having
impliedly overruled the amendments to WCA when the amendments
had been adopted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly just
slightly more than one year earlier? Was the third party tortfeasor

now liable only for that portion of causal negligence attributed to
him under CNA or did he still have to absorb the loss caused by the

statutorily immune employer? Would the workers' compensation employer now be liable for its entire portion of causal negligence according to CNA? Since under CNA it appears that the plaintiff can
collect his full recovery from a third party tortfeasor, 3 0 does it fol-

low that the third party who is "compelled to pay more than his
share" now has contribution rights against the employer? '
The argument that the enactment of the CNA impliedly repealed the 1974 amendments to WCA in the space of less than two

years predictably failed. 182 After reaffirming that the WCA amendment to section 303(b) had completely "obliterated" a common law

cause of action against the employer,1

8

the Pennsylvania Superior

127. 488 Pa. at 524, 412 A.2d at 1099 (Larsen, J., concurring).
128. See famous footnote 2 of Tsarnas: "[W]e leave for another day the issue as to
whether the employer's right of subrogation nevertheless remains unimpaired." 488 Pa. at 520,
n. 2, 412 A.2d at 1097 n.2.
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982).
130. CNA explicitly retains joint and several liability. Id.
131. "Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may
seek contribution." Id.
132. A general principle of statutory construction is the presumption against implicit
repeal of one law by a later enactment unless the two are irreconcilable. See generally, IA C.
SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed. 1972). Another rule of construction is that the general must yield to the specific. Section 7102(b) was seen as a general
statute which had to yield to section 303(b), the more specific, thus preventing recovery of
contribution from an employer. Getty v. Ajax Mfg. Corp., 129 PGH. L.J. 54, 57 (1981); Ryden
v. Johns-Manville Products, 518 F. Supp. 311, 317-18 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
133. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 293 Pa. Super. 474, 477, 439 A.2d 674,
675 (1981), (citing Bell v. Koppers Co., Inc., 481 Pa. 454, 392 A.2d 1380 (1978)).
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Court in Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp.134 held that the
employer could not be joined for any reason, including apportionment of fault under CNA. 35 According to Heckendorn, the bar to

joinder precluded an assessment of an employers' liability to an employee for negligence and to a third party tortfeasor for indemnification or contribution. 1' This holding was affirmed by the Supreme
37
Court of Pennsylvania when Heckendorn was reviewed in 1983.1
Joining the statutorily immune employer for the purpose of

fault apportionment, however, would have been an empty victory for
the third party tortfeasor unless the employer's fault was somehow
linked to the employer's right to subrogate the plaintiff's tort recovery, as it was in the former "Pennsylvania Rule." In Hamme v.
Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co.,'3 8 a Third Circuit Court of Appeals
case decided between the time of the two Heckendorn decisions,

Judge Rosenn, in an extensive and well reasoned dissent, suggested
that the superior court's decision in Heckendorn was not mandatory
precedent for a court sitting in federal diversity. Rosenn stated that
the duty of the district court was to predict how the supreme court
of the state would rule on the issue, and he believed the superior
court's Heckendorn decision would be reversed.'8 9
Judge Rosenn's main concern focused, as in Tsarnas,40 on the

reasons for allowing a negligent employer an unimpaired right to a
134. 293 Pa. Super. 474, 439 A.2d 674 (1981).
135. Id. at 482, 439 A.2d at 677-78. The appellant, Conrail, argued that Carnation, the
emp!oyer, should be joined "in order to apportion accurately the liability of all tortfeasors." Id.
at 478, 439 A.2d at 676.
136. Heckendorn, 293 Pa. Super. 474, 482, 439 A.2d 674, 678 (1981).
137. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 502 Pa. 101, 465 A.2d 609 (1983). Heckendorn cites the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 880 as supporting the proposition that
one tortfeasor's immunity from liability does not relieve another tortfeasor's full liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 880 (1979). Until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's final
pronouncement on the issue in Heckendorn, the courts in both Pennsylvania and the federal
system were split as to whether the employer could be joined as an additional defendant. See,
e.g., cases in which joinder was not permitted, Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1982); Ryden v. Johns-Manville Products, 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981);
Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1981); William Harter &
Cleaver Brooks v. Yeagley, 310 Pa. Super. 441, 456 A.2d 1021 (1983); but see, e.g., cases
which held an employer could be joined: Schaeffer v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Pa. 1980); Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
Yeagley v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 16 D. & C.3d 681 (1980) (employer may be joined for
fault apportionment process); Flack v. Calabrace, 15 D. & C.3d 765 (1980).
138. 716 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1982).

139.

Id. at 155 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The majority, in an extremely terse opinion,

believed itself to be bound by the Heckendorn superior court precedent. Judge Rosenn's dissent to Hamme traces the history of workers' compensation. It offers an extremely extensive
presentation of the issues in reconciling the mandate of fault comparison under CNA with the
WCA scheme.
140. 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980). See supra text and accompanying notes 12528.
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subrogation lien on the employee's third party tort recovery. Rosenn
suggested that the appropriate model for apportioning liability might
be to treat the employer as a "settled" defendant who has signed a
pro rata release. 14 Under that model the third party tortfeasor
would be liable only for its proportional share and the plaintiff would
get that amount plus the employer's obligatory statutory compensation payment. The problem with this solution, however, is that it is
likely that the plaintiff would be undercompensated for his injury, at
least where the employer's fault was greater than its workers' compensation obligation.
Treating an employer as a settled defendant who had not taken
a pro rata release would have a different impact on loss allocation.
The statutory amount would then be the "amount of consideration
paid,"1 42 which would be reduced from the judgment. The third
party tortfeasor would pay the whole judgment minus the workers'
compensation payments.14 8 Under this scenario the workers' compensation employer would be liable for its full statutory obligation, and
the third party tortfeasor might or might not pay more than its share
of liability depending on its percentage of fault and the amount of
the employer's liability.144 At least the third party would not end up
"holding the whole bag" as occurs in the current system. Moreover,
the plaintiff would receive a complete, but not double, recovery. 14 5
An intermediate ground between the "settlement" paradigms of
load sharing among the parties and the present system where the
third party tortfeasor pays the whole tort recovery would involve
conditioning the employer's right to subrogation on his freedom or
141. Hamme v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 716 F.2d 152, 166 n.25 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Rosenn cites Pulliam, Comparative Loss Allocation and the Rights and Liabilities of
Third Parties Against an Immune Employer: A Modest Proposal, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. 80
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Pulliam, Loss Allocation].
142. 42 PACONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982).
143. But, unlike the PaCATA, the third party would have no contribution rights against
the employer if the employer's compensation payments turned out to be less than the employer's pro rata (proportional) liability under CNA. This scenario is identical to the one
proposed by Epstein, Coordination of Workers Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage
Awards, 13 FORUM 464, 466 (1978). It would further buttress the rationale for the joinder of
the employer in the law suit since a non-settling defendant has the right to require a settling
defendant who had not signed a pro rata release to be present at the trial under the "benefit"
rule. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
144. Arguably, this inexact loss allocation is one of the quid pro quos of the workers'
compensation system.
145. This model has been criticized as providing no safety incentives for the employer
since its payment does not vary according to its behavior. Pulliam, Loss Allocation supra note
141, at 92. However, Pulliam is not completely accurate since by promoting safety in the
workplace the employer would not only exercise a measure of disinterested social benevolence,
but would have a money incentive to avoid accidents so that its experience rating would be
reduced.
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relative freedom from fault. This would be a return to the "Pennsylvania Rule," as established prior to the 1974 amendments to
WCA 146 but with a difference: the relative fault of the parties could
be taken into account when determining the exact extent of the employer's subrogation right. Judge Larsen's concurring opinion to the

Supreme Court Heckendorn decision appeared to lean towards this
middle route.147 Judge Larsen noted that subrogation rights are always subject to equitable principles, and suggested that the employer's rights should not be automatic, but rather should depend on
the employer's lack or relative lack of fault as adjudicated in some
sort of judicial proceeding. 48
The Heckendorn majority stated that the employer's statutory
right to subrogation may not be impaired by the fact that the employer may have been partially at fault.14 This statement can only
be considered dicta, however, because the question of the employer's
right to subrogation was not the precise question before the Heck-

endorn court.15 0 Thus the employer's unqualified right to subrogation
has yet to be litigated, and a system where that right would depend
on the employer's lack or degree of fault might still be possible
under present Pennsylvania law.

IX. Persons Required to Attend Trial Under CNA
As outlined above, Pennsylvania has essentially chosen to ignore
considerations of fault allocation in its comparative negligence system when an "immune" workers' compensation employer is involved.
The immune employer is not liable for any of the loss involved other
146. See supra text accompanying notes 106-15.
147. Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 502 Pa. 101, 109, 465 A.2d 609, 613
(1983) (Larsen, J., concurring).
148. Id. Larsen also made the identical point in his concurrence to the majority's opinion in Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 524, 412 A.2d 1094, 1099
(1980) (Larsen, J., concurring).
149. Heckendorn, 502 Pa. at 108-9, 465 A.2d at 613.
If the negligence of a third-party tortfeasor is subsequently determined to have
caused the injury 'in whole or in part,' the employee is entitled to recover the full
amount of his damages from the tortfeasor, subject to the employer's right to
reimbursement from the workers' compensation payments made as a result of
the injury. The issue of the employer's negligence is as irrelevant at the subrogation stage of the proceedings as it is at the trial, and as it is in every case of
employee injury in which no third-party tortfeasor is involved.
150. Id. The issue before the Heckendorn court was whether the employer could be
joined for the purpose of fault apportionment under CNA. Arguably, the rationale underlying
the present system of allocation of losses in the Pennsylvania workers' compensation system is
an economic one and not really "legal" at all. It can be viewed as a system which partially
"funds" the workers' compensation scheme. It is, moreover, significant that Pennsylvania's present loss allocation system is now in line with that in place in the majority of jurisdictions.
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than its workers' compensation benefits. Furthermore, if a third
party tortfeasor is present, the employer will be able to recoup its
statutory compensation payments and cannot be joined in the lawsuit
as an additional party, even for the limited purpose of fault allocation under CNA.
In situations not involving statutorily immune employers, it seemed
questionable at first whether, after CNA, a party who had been released could or should be made a party for the purpose of fault apportionment. The main reason for not joining someone whose liability has already been fixed by a release as a co-defendant is that there
would be no incentive for him to vigorously defend the issue of his
liability. 5 1 This could lead to an acquiescence of liability by the settler during the trial in the fault allocation process which could unduly burden the remaining defendants. On the other hand, a defense
lawyer could try to prove that the settling defendant was the only
tortfeasor. This could have a devastating effect on a plaintiff.
The problems of the presence of a settler at trial are potentially
magnified under CNA where shares are proportional. Prior to CNA,
if the settler took a pro rata release, the non-settler could not shift
most of his share by lessening his liability, since if he were liable at
all, he would still be liable for his whole pro rata share. This would
be true whether he was one percent negligent or ninety-nine percent
negligent.' 5 2 After CNA, if a non-settler can reduce his fault allocation to one percent, the settler who took a pro rata release would
have satisfied the other ninety-nine percent of the liability, no matter
what amount the settlement entailed.
The issue of whether the Comparative Negligence Act required
a settled co-defendant to be present during a trial for the negligence
apportionment process was adjudicated in 1981 in Young v. Verson
Allsteel Press Company. 58 Verson, one of two tortfeasors, executed
151. See, e.g., Lawless v. Central Engineering Co. 502 F. Supp. 308, 311 and n.3 (1980)
(presence of settler at trial derogates from the adversarial nature of lawsuit).
152. Under pre-CNA, a party's pro rata share would be one-half if there were two
tortfeasors. See, Schwarzel v. Philadelphia Gas Works, July Term, 1980, No. 4098 (C.P.
Phila. Co. Dec. 24, 1980) (opinion of Judge Forer).
153. 524 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The federal district court was faced with deciding this issue under the CNA since it had not yet been decided on the state court appellate
level. A year later, in Young v. Verson AlIsteel Press Co., 539 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
the court faced the issue of whether evidence of the release could be placed in evidence at trial
pursuant to FED. R. EvID. Rule 408. In holding in the negative, the court erroneously assumed
that 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6141(c) (Purdon 1982), the state analog to Rule 408, was
enacted contemporaneously and in conjunction with CNA. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6141(c)
was originally enacted in 1968.
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a "Griffin" release which conceded liability and provided that the
judgment would be reduced by what was ultimately found to be Verson's percentage of fault." 4 After summarizing the pre-CNA cases

dealing with the presence of the settler at the trial, the court concluded that CNA did not change the underlying rule that a co-defendant must derive a real "benefit" from the joinder of the settled

party to require him to be present at trial. 15 In Young, the co-de-

fendant could not derive such a real "benefit" because the type of

release given to Verson was a "Griffin" release. ' The court was
concerned with the prejudicial potential of a pro forma appearance
in which the settler does not have the self-interest to contest his
7
liability.1'
Pennsylvania's policy of favoring settlements was cited as another reason supporting the non-presence of the settler at trial. 186
Any rule compelling a defendant who has taken a release to attend
trial would have a chilling effect on settlements because of the addi-

tional time, effort and expense a court appearance would require.
X. The Phantom Tortfeasor
Tortfeasors who are not before the court either because they are
not amenable to suit in the jurisdiction or because they are nowhere
154. 524 F. Supp. at 1148. A "Griffin" release, named after plaintiff in Griffin v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974), see supra text accompanying notes 82-83, is a release
that concedes joint tortfeasor status and provides for a reduction in the judgment by the settler's pro rata share. It is identical to a pro rata release. See supra text and accompanying
note 78.
155. Id. at 1150-52. This "benefit rule" is summarized in Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348,
123 A.2d 422 (1956). In Davis, the co-defendant needed to have a judicial determination of
the settler's tortfeasor status. Otherwise her payment would have been that of a "volunteer"
and would not have inured the benefit of the non-settler since the settler in Davis had not
taken a pro rata release, nor had she conceded liability. See supra text and accompanying
notes 80-81.
156. See supra note 154. Young, 524 F. Supp. at 1151 and n.16.
157. An additional reason cited by Young for the rule that settlers who took pro rata or
"Griffin" releases did not need to be present at trial under CNA was based on the premise that
the CNA effected a change in Pennsylvania law in "cast[ing] the law with a recognizable bias
in favor of plaintiffs whom were injured when they had been less than fifty-one percent culpable." Id. at 1150. Therefore the decision as to whether the settler should be present should be
consistent with this "plaintiff bias" and the courts ". . . should not undercut the legislature's
intention." Id. at 1050-51. The Young court cites Judge Newcomber's opinion in Lawless v.
Central Engineering Co., 502 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1980) for the proposition that a present
defendant who had settled and was therefore "acquiescent" could likely effect a reduction in a
plaintiff's award since he may not resist the non-settler's attempt to shift liability to him. See
supra text and accompanying notes 151 & 152. The "plaintiff bias" theory is also presented in
Goldstein, The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act: The Fifty-One Percent Solution,
50 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 355-56 (1977).
158. Young, 524 F. Supp. at 1152.
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How should the

secondary loss attributable to the "phantom" tortfeasor be allocated
under CNA? Should the remaining defendants absorb the liability of
the "phantom" or should they be liable only for their percentage
share under CNA? If the secondary loss is not allowed to fall on the
plaintiff, is it somehow to be spread among all the parties to the
lawsuit, including the plaintiff; or is it to be absorbed solely among
the defendants? If so, in what proportions? Causation problems arise
in this context as well. How can a jury determine causation when
one of the actors is absent? A severe conceptual problem may result
under a comparative negligence system whether it is decided that the
fault of the "phantom" must be disregarded or that it must be taken
into account in the causation calculation.1 60

Although the Act passed with little legislative history, 16' the
legislators who proposed the bill were aware that the language of
CNA was nearly identical to the language of the Wisconsin statute
after which it is modeled. 1 2 The Wisconsin statute is interpreted so
that fault apportionment includes a fault allocation for absent settled
parties and immune parties. " Because the doctrine of joint and several liability is well established in Wisconsin, 164 fault apportionment

which includes an allocation for the "phantom" has the effect of entirely shifting the secondary loss caused by the "phantom" to the
party defendants rather than to the plaintiff. Wisconsin takes the
position that it is important to have a completely accurate fault apportionment among all tortfeasors. Such an accurate fault apportionment in a system of joint and several liability isolates a plaintiff from
having to absorb more than his share of liability. In interpreting its
CNA, Pennsylvania has not considered itself to be bound to follow
all of Wisconsin's interpretations of its statute and indeed did not
follow the Wisconsin rule providing for a specific fault allocation for
"phantom" tortfeasors.' 6
159. An example of a "phantom" is a hit and run driver or an unknown driver who sets
off a chain accident on the highway. See, e.g., Souto v. Segal, 302 So.2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App,. 1974). A related problem to the "phantom" is the insolvent defendant. See infra text
and accompanying notes 181-97.
160. See infra note 168.
161. See supra note 2.
162. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
163. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); Walker v. Kroger
Grocery and Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
164. See, e.g., Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Construction Corp.,
96 Wis.2d 314, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980).
165. Some differences between CNA and the Wisconsin statute are as follows: Wisconsin compares negligence and strict liability under its statute. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116
Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., v. Collins, 53 U.S.L.W.

PA

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

Unfortunately, a close look at the language of Pennsylvania's
CNA does not settle the question of how to allocate the fault of the
"phantom" tortfeasor. The Act states that a defendant is liable for
his percentage of negligence, and that this percentage should be
compared with the negligence of all the defendants "against whom
recovery is allowed."' 16 But nowhere does the Act state that the total
percentage of all negligence must necessarily add up to 100%. Theoretically, if the negligence of the "phantom" were to be calculated in
the fault apportionment process, the total percentage of negligence
among the parties in the lawsuit could be less than 100%, and such
an interpretation would be consistent with the language of the
CNA. 167 A direct ruling on this important issue has not been offered
by Pennsylvania courts and it has wrongly been assumed by commentators and jurists that the language of the statute can only be
interpreted to mean that the negligence of all parties must equal
100% of the negligence involved.'6 8 Case after case interpreting
3236, 83 L. Ed.2d 51, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984). The Wisconsin statute refers to actions by
"persons" and negligence of a "person" in the singular rather than "defendant or defendants"
of the CNA. For that reason, perhaps, Wisconsin courts came up with a different "aggregate"
rule than Pennsylvania. In Wisconsin, a plaintiff cannot recover from any single defendant
whose negligence is less than the plaintiff's, even if the combined negligence of all the
tortfeasors is greater than plaintiff's. See Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis.2d 157, 164, 242 N.W.2d
910, 914 (1976); compare Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 483 A.2d 474 (1984) (plaintiff's recovery barred only when this causal negligence is greater than that of the combined
negligence of all defendants). See infra text and accompanying notes 177-80.

166. 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 7102(b) (Purdon 1982).

167. This holds true unless a "phantom" is interpreted as not being a defendant "against
whom recovery is allowed" because of inamenability to suit. Even so, the allocation percentages need not add up to 100%.
168. The only other commentator who believes that this issue has not yet been interpreted in Pennsylvania is McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence - A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1979). See
Symposium - Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 419 (1978-79);
Timby & Plevyak, The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute on Traditional Tort Concepts and Doctrines, 24 VILL. L. REV. 453, 455, n.6, (1978-79) and Griffith,
Hemsley & Burr, Contribution, Indemnity, Settlements, and Releases; What the Pennsylvania
Comparative Negligence Statute Did Not Say, 24 VILL. L. REV. 494, 499-503 (1978-79).
Beasley & Tunstall, Jury Instructions Concerning Multiple Defendants and Strict Liability
After the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, 24 VILL. L. REV. 518, (1978-79). The
Beasley and Tunstall article discusses standard jury instructions in relation to the Act. Although the authors contended that the "plain language" of the CNA indicated that the fault
of the "phantom" should not be taken into account, id. at 528, the authors admit "it would
have been possible to use more precise language." Id. at 529.
The material in the Beasley and Tunstall article was adopted virtually verbatim in PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

Pa. Bar Institute as § 3.03A

(Rev. 1984). Question 5 of the instructions reads as follows "Taking the combined negligence
that was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm at 100%, what percentage
of that causal negligence was attributable to the defendant (each of the defendants you have
found causally negligent) and what percentage was attributable to the Plaintiff?" (emphasis
added). The instruction indicates that this total must add up to 100%. This means that as a
result of a de facto practice, the fault of the "phantom" is disregarded under CNA.
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CNA merely repeats the words of the act believing them to "prove"
that the phantom tortfeasor's percentage of liability should not enter
into the fault allocation calculus.
The court in Ryden v. Johns-Manville Products169 indirectly
addressed this issue. The case involved products liability in a workers' compensation setting. In dicta the court stated that under the
language of CNA there was no suggestion that all tortfeasors needed
to be brought into court and that an apportionment among all per170
sons responsible for the injury. was not a requirement of the Act.
Because the statement in Ryden is dicta, however, the question of
the "phantom" tortfeasor is yet another issue still open to litigation
in Pennsylvania.
The de facto rule assigning the negligence of the phantom defendant to the other parties to the law suit provides the negligent
parties with the incentive to locate the "phantom" tortfeasor to join
to the action as an impleaded defendant. In fact, CNA was amended
in 1982 to allow for this result, and it now specifically includes impleaded defendants as "defendants against whom recovery is
sought. 1 7 1 There is a certain justice in the notion that the
tortfeasors who caused the injury should bear the burden of finding
and joining all available culpable parties. It would seem unfair to
give a blameless plaintiff the burden of litigating and proving issues
relating to the liability of a non-party.172 The plaintiff has incentive
to find and sue the "phantom," but only to the extent that the defendants already in the action are insolvent or underinsured, or the
plaintiff is partly at fault. In such a case he might want the "phanDisregarding the "phantom's" fault could lead to tremendous conceptual problems for a
jury, for the jury is under a duty to find that certain causative factors amount to 100% when
they in fact do not. What if the "phantom" defendant's negligence caused 98% of the injury?
There might be tremendous resistance to allocating all negligence to one or two negligent
defendants who are amenable to suit. The jury instructions also completely duck the problem
of how to distribute the secondary loss.
The problems juries can experience on this issue are exemplified by the following case. In
Model v. Rabinowitz. 313 So.2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied 327 So.2d 34
(1976), a jury apportioned 14% negligence to a landlord and 28% to a plaintiff in an accident
in which a portion of ceiling fell on plaintiff. The district court of appeals reversed this finding.
The problem was that the jury simply did not allocate the remaining 58%, believing it to be
"an Act of God." The appeals court stated: "In any event, it is improper in comparative negligence situations for the jury to apportion negligence [to] 'phantom' tortfeasors who are not
before the court; or even to the Supreme Being." Id. at 60 n. I.
169. 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa., 1981).
170. Id. at 316.
171. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(d) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
172. See National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d
1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983). Frackelton provides an excellent, detailed treatment of this "phantom" tortfeasor problem by directly dealing with it rather than by reaching, as have Pennsylvania courts, by a de facto practice supported neither by legislative fiat nor judicial decision.
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tom" joined so he will not have to absorb some of the secondary loss
caused by the missing defendant.17 8 The end result of Pennsylvania's
treatment of the "phantom" is a mechanism which encourages as
much final adjudication as possible in a single lawsuit. 174
Certain issues relating to the "phantom" still persist in Pennsylvania. What happens if after trial and judgment the tortfeasors who
paid the judgment find and sue the "phantom" in a different forum?
Is the "phantom" tortfeasor bound by collateral estoppel by the adjudication of his negligence in the prior lawsuit to which he was not
a party? Precedents in other jurisdictions indicate that the "phantom's" liability will have to be relitigated in a new action. 17 5 On the
other hand, the plaintiff may be collaterally estopped to deny issues
that were litigated in the former suit. 17 There are problems in this
because each tortfeasor's percentage of liability will have to be adjusted in the second suit to allow for a finding of the "phantom's"
negligence. And what if the second action is a contribution in which
a plaintiff-at-fault is not present? Is a plaintiff now bound to his
possibly recalculated percentage of negligence? These considerations
support the position that Pennsylvania has taken: the negligence of a
"phantom" tortfeasor should not be considered in absentia.
XI.

The Aggregate Rule

Another major issue left open by CNA was whether the "aggregate" or the "individual" rule should apply in Pennsylvania's
"greater than" system of comparative negligence. Should a plaintiff's
negligence be compared with the aggregate negligence of all the defendants in determining whether a plaintiff's negligence is "greater
than" that of the "defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought" and therefore barring him from recovery? 7 7 Or should a
plaintiff's negligence be compared with the negligence of each de173. This is because CNA retains joint and several liability. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7102(b) (Purdon 1982).
174. In a system of several rather than joint and several liability, these dynamics would
completely change. Under several liability the incentive would be completely on the plaintiff to
sue as many liable tortfeasors as possible, since the extent of his recovery would depend on
how many solvent tortfeasors were present in the action. In a several system, it is the plaintiff
that bears the total risk of this secondary loss. See Brown v. Kiell, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867
(1978).
175. See, e.g., Young v. Steinberg, 53 N.J. 252, 250 A.2d 13 (1969); Nat'l Farmers
Union v. Frackleton, 662 P.2d at 1058; Shanley v. Callanan Industries, Inc., 54 N.Y.2d 52,
444 N.Y.S.2d 585, 492 N.E.2d 104 (1981).
176. See Frackleton, 662 P.2d at 1060.
177. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982).
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fendant separately? 178
A decision to adopt either the "aggregate" rule or the "individual" approach has a tremendous impact on the liability of both
plaintiffs and defendants. There are strong arguments on either side
of the issue. Proponents of the "individual" approach would posit
that the aggregate rule is inconsistent with Pennsylvania's hybrid
system of comparative negligence which forecloses a plaintiff from
recovering if he is more than fifty percent negligent. The individual
system can be seen as a "miniature" of the hybrid system. Another
argument for the individual approach is that it is basically unfair for
a more negligent plaintiff to be able to recover from a less negligent
defendant. Moreover, a defendant whose negligence is much less
than plaintiff's may be the only solvent defendant and therefore
would have to bear a disproportionate amount of the loss if the aggregate approach were to be adopted. In Elder v. Orluck, it was this
exact scenario which came before the court. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the "aggregate" approach should
17
prevail. '
There are, of course, competing equities supporting the aggregate approach adopted in Elder. One rationale is that the aggregate
rule more clearly effectuates Pennsylvania's policy for a full recovery
by the plaintiff and a sharing of liability among all responsible parties.1 s0 Load sharing would occur because each defendant under the
"aggregate" system is liable for its own share no matter whether its
individual percentage of negligence is greater or less than that of the
plaintiff as long as the sum of plaintiff's negligence is not greater
than fifty percent. In addition, the "individual" approach unreasonably burdens a plaintiff who attempts to recover from many slightly
negligent parties. Finally, the "aggregate" approach is consistent
with the rule that loss should fall on a wrongdoer and not on an
178. The aggregate rule is also termed the "combined" approach. See Elder v. Orluck,
334 Pa. Super. 329, 483 A.2d 474 (1984), cert. granted, 508 Pa. 1, 493 A.2d 1346 (1985). It
has also been called the "unit" rule. See McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence - a Puzzling Choice 32 OKLA. L. REv. 1,

4 (1979). The antithesis of the aggregate approach is the individual approach in which the
negligence of the plaintiff is compared with that of each individual defendant separately.
179. In Elder, a slightly negligent public entity, the city of Harrisville, had to absorb
most of the loss caused by the defendant Orluck since it had little hope of getting full contribution from him. Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa. Super. 329, 483 A.2d 474 (1984), cert. granted, 508
Pa. 1, 493 A.2d 1346 (1985). This is one of the most complete and well reasoned opinions
concerning comparative negligence filed by a Pennsylvania court to date. It gives a good overview of various systems in place in jurisdictions throughout the United States and why they
evolved as they did.
180. Although plaintiff's full recovery may be at the expense of a slightly negligent defendant as in the Elder scenario. Id.
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injured party.
XII.

Joint and Several Liability

Underlying criticisms of the "aggregate" approach are problems
in loss allocation caused by the system of joint and several liability.
Joint and several liability is part of the common law of Pennsylvania
and was specifically retained by the PaCATA and CNA 81 This theory allows a plaintiff to recover the full amount of damages from any
defendant leaving that defendant both the burden and the right to
obtain contribution from the other tortfeasors. 182 A recent flood of
commentaries, both in the scholarly law journals and in the mass
media of the legal profession, have begun to analyze and criticize the
system of joint and several liability in light of present day economic

conditions. 18
Although Pennsylvania has held fast to the doctrine of joint and
several liability, several states have begun to explore a middle

ground which mitigates some of the harshness the system poses to
solvent defendants involved in accidents with largely responsible insolvent defendants. Viewed another way, these statutes redistribute
secondary losses so that they do not necessarily fall either solely on
the plaintiff, as in a "several" system, or solely on the solvent defendant or defendants, as happens in a system of joint and several
liability.
Texas has adopted a unique manner of accommodating the interests and equities. involved in loss allocation under a comparative
negligence act. In that jurisdiction, the aggregate rule applies so long

as a plaintiff's negligence is less than a particular defendant's. If it is
greater, the plaintiff may still recover from that defendant, but only
181. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7102(b) (Purdon 1982).

§ 8322 (Purdon 1982); 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

182. Joint and several liability has been called "entire" liability. It is to be distinguished
from "several" liability, where the plaintiff can execute on each defendant "severally" for that
defendant's portion of liability. See, Fleming, Foreward: Comparative Negligence at Last: By

Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239 (1976).
183. See. e.g., Fleming, Report to the Joint Commission of the California Legislature
on Tort Liability on the Problems with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (1979); Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motor
Association v. Superior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1978); Adams, Settlements After Li:
But is it "Fair?", 10 PRAc. L.J. 729 (1979); and see e.g., literature in the "popular" legal

journals: Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. JOURNAL 61, July
1985; Goddard, Joint and Several Liability Under Attack," ATLA ADVOCATE 4, June/July
1985. The Goddard article gives a plaintiff's bar view of the virtues of joint and several
liability.
The following bills have been presented to the Pennsylvania Legislature. These proposals
include provision for the abrogation of joint and several liability, substituting several liability
in its stead. See H. 2426, § 7105 (1986); S. 621, § 8374 (1985).
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on the basis of several liability. Consequently, the more negligent
plaintiff bears the risk of the insolvency of the less-negligent defendant but still has a chance to recover for his injuries if the defendant
184
is solvent.
Minnesota takes a slightly different approach. If a joint or concurrent tort is involved, several liability will prevail. If plaintiff has
no contributory fault or a pure tort is involved, 185 joint and several
liability will apply. 18" Uncollectable damages will be allocated
among all the parties to the law suit, including the plaintiff-atfault. 187 Kansas' system is similar to Minnesota's. Where the plaintiff is not at fault, the rule will be joint and several liability;88 but if
there is any plaintiff fault, then several liability will apply.1
Oklahoma has chosen several liability as the basic rule, but retains joint and several liability in cases in which damages cannot be
apportioned by a jury or when the plaintiff is not at fault. This system has essentially corrected Oklahoma's previous system for loss
apportionment which had been joint and several liability but with no
contribution. 89 Other states, among them New Mexico, have come
down firmly in favor of several liability. 90 Other "several" states are
New Hampshire, Vermont, Ohio and Nevada.' 91 In Kentucky the
question of whether or not joint and several liability applies is one
for the jury. This unique and effective solution allows the trier of
fact to balance the equities of the solvent or insolvent parties on a
184. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon's Supp. 1985). The "Texas" approach is also now in effect in four other states: Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3)
(1985)); Indiana (34 IND. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-33-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1986)); Louisiana (LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West Supp. 1986) and Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 18.485 (1983)).
185. See supra text and accompanying notes 25-26, 29.
186. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 subd. I (West Supp. 1986); see Kowalske v. Armour
& Co., 300 Minn. 301, 220 N.W.2d 268 (1974).
187. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1). This solution is similar to that of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, see infra, text and accompanying notes 206-23.
188. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (Kn. 1978).
189. See Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978); Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980). The system in place in Oklahoma is similar to Minnesota's, but the theoretic basis is different, perhaps emanating from the fact that Oklahoma has
a contribution statute dealing only with contract and not with tort. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 831
(1971). In this context a system of several liability should be seen as an advance over the
inadequacies of a system of joint and several liability with no contribution.
190. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. 1982). The
Bartlett decision provides an excellent survey of this issue in the comparative negligence field.
In Bartlett, a truck owner whose negligence was 30% was held not to have to bear the secondary loss caused by a "phantom" defendant whose negligence was 70%.
191. New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983)), but joint and several is
retained if because of procedural bars or immunities, a plaintiff can recover only from one
defendant; Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 and 1985 Supp.)). See Howard v.
Spafford, 321 A.2d 74 (Vt. 1974); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.29(a)(2) (Page
1985)) and Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3) (1985)).
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case-by-case basis. 19"
Certain states justify retention of joint and several liability on
the basis of a previously existing contribution statute which serves to
allocate uncollectable damages among the defendants. Thus a "legislative" intent to allow a plaintiff to recover from any one tortfeasor
is discerned.193 The California Supreme Court gave three reasons for
the retention of joint and several liability in that state. It pointed out
that apportioning fault does not make an "indivisible" injury "divisible." It also termed the nature of plaintiff's fault as being on a "different level" than that of the defendant, and it cites California state
policy that an injured plaintiff should be able to fully recover for his
194
injuries.
Some commentators believe that a system of joint and several
liability is inconsistent with a "pure" system of comparative negligence. The reasoning is that in a pure system a plaintiff is never
barred from a certain modicum of recovery. Therefore, it is thought
that these plaintiffs who can recover in more cases should bear some
95
of the risk of insolvency of the defendants."
The basic considerations underlying the debate on joint and several liability are economic ones. The no-fault commentators see the
common law tort system with its high transactional costs and potential for both over-and under-compensation for plaintiffs as problematic. 96 The popular advent of the comparative negligence system in
the 1970's and 1980's itself can be seen as arising from the same
source of concerns as the no-fault movement. It was thought that a
system of comparative negligence could cure some of the problems of

undercompensation for plaintiffs and inequitable load sharing for defendants.1 97 But, as we have seen, the comparative negligence system
192. Ohio River Pipeline Corp. v. Landrum, 580 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
193. See, e.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979).
194. Adams, Settlements After Li: But is it "Fair", 10 PAC. L. REv. 729, 739-40
(1979), (citing American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578, 588-90, 578
P.2d 899, 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188-89 (1978)). See Criticism of these factors in Note,
Torts - Liability of Joint Tortfeasors - Apportionment of Damages Between Joint
Tortfeasors by Verdict of Jury, 14 VA. L. REV. 677, 680-81 (1927-8). This hoary source debunks the common law dichotomy between concurrent and pure torts. Also see Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1978), which posits that plaintiffs as a class should have no greater claim
on the courts' sympathies than defendants.

195. See Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Ct., 20 Cal.3d 578, 613, 578 P.2d 899, 922, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 205 (1978) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
196. See, e.g., O'CONNELL & HENDERSON, TORT LAw, No FAULT AND BEYOND, Chapter 2 (1975) and Keeton, The Case for No-Fault Insurance, 44 Miss. L.J. 1 (1973).
197. McNichols, supra note 168.
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has not completely fulfilled its promise to cure the inequities inher-

ent in tort loss allocation. Some of the inequities have been lessened,
while others have stubbornly persisted.
XIII. Settlements Under CNA
The system for settlements and contribution in Pennsylvania
under the PaCATA in conjunction with the Mong and Daugherty
rulings led to a stagnant settlement environment.

98

Although Mong

effectuates one of Pennsylvania's important policies, complete but
not double recovery for an injured plaintiff, the state-held policy encouraging out-of-court settlements was stymied by the dynamics established by Mong and the Contribution Act.' 99
In 1984, an attempt was made to reverse the Mong and Daugherty precedents in Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets,200 a case arising
under CNA. Charles was a case factually very similar to Daugherty,'0 ' where a settling tortfeasor "overpaid" his share of liability.
The plaintiff sued to recover the entire proportional liability of the
non-settler rather than having that liability reduced by the overpayment of the settler.2 0 The plaintiff correctly argued that the present
system discourages settlement because, by settling, a plaintiff only
stands to lose out on full recovery and can never "gain. ' ' 211 The rul-

ing in Charles hinged on a determination whether the adoption of
CNA impliedly overruled PaCATA and the Mong and Daugherty
precedents. The plaintiff in Charles pointed to cases in other jurisdictions with similar comparative negligence statutes which hold that

a double recovery by plaintiff is tolerable since it furthers the goal
198. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71, 75-78 and 90-100.
199. Possibly because of the poor results in encouraging out-of-court settlements, Pennsylvania adopted a system of delay damages in 1978. The rule provides an incentive to settle
by penalizing a dilatory plaintiff who does not accept an offer for settlement by a defendant
which later proves to be at least 80% of the final verdict. PA.R.C.P. 238.
200. 330 Pa. Super. 76, 478 A.2d 1359 (1984). On September 9, 1985, Charles was
argued before the supreme court. The case resulted in a split decision and the court has asked
for reargument. 510 A.2d 350.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70, 75-77.
202. Plaintiff cited the "plain language" of 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon
1982), which states that " . . . each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total
dollar amount awarded as damages.
... (emphasis added).
203. A system of "equitable" apportionment of damages like the kind in place in Pennsylvania is antithetical to an environment in which settlements can thrive. A plaintiff can only
lose by settling "lightly" (i.e. for an amount which may turn out to be less than the proportional verdict). It is not an evenhanded system since it is a "no-win" situation for a plaintiff,
unless the settler is deemed to be a "volunteer." See Kaplan, From Contribution to Good
Faith Settlements: Equity Where Are You? 49 JAL 771, 783 (1984), and supra text and
accompanying notes 86-91 on the "volunteer."
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creating an environment in which settlements can thrive. 0 4 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed with the plaintiff's analysis.
It upheld the Mong and Daugherty precedents because they created
a system in which no party would reap the benefit of an undeserved
windfall. In September 1985 Charles was argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The case resulted in a split decision and the
court has asked for reargument. 20 5 Since the court could find for the
plaintiff in Charles without overturning the other major CNA related decisions, it is possible that the Charles plaintiff will be
successful.
XIV.

The Uniform Comparative Fault Act

Although completely ignored in most jurisdictions, 2 08 the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Acts, provides overall the
best unified treatment for handling the competing interests involved
in a loss allocation system under comparative negligence. 07 In one
sweeping document, the UCFA settles perplexing and interrelated
questions of contribution, risk of insolvency, immunities, and phantom defendants. It also treats the substantive issues of strict liability,
breach of warranty, and assumption of risk. In accomplishing all of
the above, it is a paradigm of brevity and clarity.
One of the basic features of the UCFA is that it purports to
compare fault of all types. For that reason strict liability for product
injuries is compared with negligence under the act. 0 8 It is probably
this factor of the UCFA more than any other that has decreased its
attractiveness as an alternative to the patchwork of precedents and
204. Charles, 330 Pa. Super. at 82, 478 A.2d at 1361-2; Rogers v. Spady, 147 N.J.
Super. 274, 371 A.2d 285 (1977) (dicta); Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D.
1979); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1972). A good argument to
support the position of the plaintiff in Charles is by way of analogy to contract law. Letting a
plaintiff keep an "over" settlement allows him to get the "benefit of his bargain." The nonsettler is not prejudiced since he is liable only for that which is caused by his own fault.
205. 510 A.2d 350 (1986).
206. Only three states have adopted the UFCA: Kentucky, Missouri, Washington. Kentucky and Missouri adopted itby judicial decision. Hillen v.Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984)
(adopts UFCA jury instructions); and Gustafson v.Benda, 661 S.W.2d II (Mo.1983) (instructing trial
court to follow UCFA §§ 1-6 to provide guidance "insofar as possible" infuture
cases.) Id. at 15.
207. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1986). See Wade Uniform Comparative Fault Act: What Should It Provide?, 10 U. MICH. JL. REV. 220 (1977);
Comment, Comparative Contribution, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 173 (1980), and Miller, Extending
Fairness Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 14 PAC. L.J. 835 (1983).
208. UCFA Commissioner's Comment to § I at 40 (Supp. 1986) "Effect of Contributory Fault."
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comparative negligence and contribution statutes that exist in most
states.2 0 9 There is no reason, however, that a state adopting the
UCFA could not amend it to conform with its policy in that area of
the law. 21 0
Another reason states have been reluctant to adopt the UFCA
is that it adopts the "pure" form of comparative negligence,2 1 ' which
is favored in only a minority of American jurisdictions. Pennsylvania's CNA utilizes a hybrid approach as do most states' comparative
negligence statutes. Aside from its provisions on pure comparative
negligence and comparison of strict liability with negligence, the
UCFA could benefit Pennsylvania in providing solutions for some of
the problems that plague its system of comparative negligence.
The UCFA, like Pennsylvania's CNA, does not assign a percentage of negligence to a "phantom" tortfeasor, but it divides the
secondary loss caused by the "phantom" among all the remaining
parties to the action, including the claimant-at-fault.21 2 The UCFA
also puts to rest many of the problems associated with a system of
joint and several liability. In a single coup de grace, joint and several
liability is retained, but with a difference: the percentage fault of
each party, including settlers, is to be ascertained and converted into
an "equitable share" of the underlying money damages. 3 Judgment
is to be entered upon each liable party according to the rules of joint
and several liability. " " If any part of a party's equitable share is
uncollectable due to insolvency, immunities, and so forth, a reallocation of the uncollectable amount will occur. The secondary loss will
be divided among all other defendants plus the claimant at fault ac209. See supra note 16 on the Third Circuit's position on whether to compare strict
product liability with negligence in its system of comparative negligence. The sentiments on
this issue are apparently also very strong in other jurisdictions.
210. This is true, notwithstanding the admonition of UCFA § 7 (Uniformity of Application and Construction).
211. UCFA § 1. "Effect of Contributory Fault." "[A]ny contributory fault ... diminishes proportionately the amount awarded . . . but does not bar recovery." The 1979 addition
to the Commissioners' Comments provides for an alternative for states that want to continue
their "hybrid" of "modified" form of comparative negligence. UFCA § 1, at 40. The Commissioners suggest, however, that states should not be "wedded" to the hybrid forms. Id. A legitimate argument in support of a hybrid system is the issue of causation: if the plaintiff's fault is
more than the defendant's, how can one say that the defendant or defendants substantially

caused the injury?
212. Commissioners' Comments to UFCA § 2, at 41 (Supp. 1986). This was a "deliberate decision" made to avoid difficulties in fault determination, statute of limitation problems,
and issues of collateral estoppel. See supra discussion of the "phantom" tortfeasor, text and
accompanying notes 159-76.
213. UFCA § 2(a) at 40 (Supp. 1986).
214. Id. § 2(c), at 41.
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cording to their respective percentages of fault.2 15
The last three sections of the UCFA are intended to replace the

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in states following the
principle of comparative fault.2 16 They bear greater similarity to the
1955 UCATA than to the 1939 version (PaCATA) in that they provide that contribution is available to a settler only to the extent the

amount paid in settlement was "reasonable.

'217

If a tortfeasor was

not a party to the first action, but his equitable share was ascer-

tained in that action and was paid by a co-defendant under the rule
of joint and several liability, the paying defendant is entitled to con-

tribution from the party who was absent. 1

If the liability of the

missing party was not established in the underlying action, fault may
be reallocated either as between the defendants, or there may be a
complete reallocation of liability among all parties if the claimant at

fault is also either voluntarily joined or brought in as a party. 21 9
The release section of the UCFA differs from PaCATA more in
theory than in practice. Under UCFA a settlement reduces the claim
by the released person's equitable share of the obligation rather than
by the amount of consideration paid. 220 This difference, however, is
215. Id. § 2(d), at 43. A party's "new" percentage of fault will be computed without
taking into account the insolvent party's percentage as follows: A sues B, C and D. A's damages are $10,000. A is 40% at fault; B is 30% at fault, C is 30% at fault and D is 0% at fault.
A's equitable share is $4,000 ($40% of $10,000). B's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of
$10,000) and C's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of $10,000). A is awarded judgment jointly
and severally against B and C for $6,000 in damages ($10,000 minus $4,000, which is A's
equitable share).
If B's share is uncollectable, B's equitable share ($3,000) is reallocated between A and C
in proportion to their respective percentages A and C's percentages must add up to 100%.
Since the ratio of A's equitable share to B's is 4 to 3, A's equitable share is increased by 4/7
of $3,000 or $1,714 and C's equitable share is increased by 3/7 of $3,000 or $1,286. See id. at
44-45 (Comment). The assessment of uncollectable amount must be made not later than one
year after judgment. A party whose liability has been reallocated is still subject to a subsequent contribution action. Id. § 2(d), at 41.
216. UFCA §§ 4, 5, & 6 (Supp. 1985). See Comment, id. at 47.
217. Id. § 4(b). Compare with 1955 version of the UCATA. 12 ULA. § l(d). The
UCFA still provides for contribution rights only if the liability has been extinguished rather
than merely lessened. Here, as in both the 1939 and 1955 UCATAs, the Commissioners are
mute as to why they wrote the troublesome "extinguish" language into the UCFA. See supra
text and accompanying notes 62-71 on Mong.
218. Id. § 5(a), at 45. Neither the Act nor the Commissioners' Comments envision any
problems collateral estoppel could pose. [Note that the Commissioners' Illustration No. 8 apparently contains an error: the joint-and-several judgment against B and C should read
$12,000 rather than $6,000 and the amount B is entitled to in contribution against C should
read $6,000, not $3,000.]
219. Id. § 5(b). A distinct difference in fault allocation would result under each of these
alternatives. In the first alternative, everyone but the plaintiff would likely have its liability
reduced. If the plaintiff joins in the contribution action, he also has the opportunity to have
part of his fault reallocated to the new defendant in the contribution action.
220. Id. § 6, at 45. See PaCATA, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982).
PaCATA provides for a pro tanto reduction unless the percentage share by which the claim is
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rendered less significant by the fact that in most cases under PaCATA a settler would have taken a pro rata release, thereby reduc-

ing a plaintiff's claim by what is in effect the releasee's "equitable
share." The result under UCFA would therefore be identical in prac-

tice to the provision for release in the PaCATA.
The UCFA Comment suggests two alternatives in its discussion
of immunities. The first is to treat the immune tortfeasor as a "settled" party so that the remaining liability is reduced by its equitable
share. However, the Commissioners believe that leaving the secondary loss on the plaintiff is "unfair" and therefore supply a second
alternative. This involves treating the equitable share of the immune
tortfeasor as an uncollectable share and reallocating that portion to
2 21
the other parties to the action, including the claimant at fault.

The Commissioners do not take a stand with respect to contri-

bution rights and the statutorily immune workers' compensation employer. They expressly leave that issue as a policy question to be
answered by the state legislatures. 2 The Commissioners do, however, point out various possibilities for loss allocation. These range on
a continuum from complete contribution rights against the employer

for the full amount of the employer's liability by a third party
tortfeasor, to the reduction of possible recovery by the plaintiff
against a third-party by the employer's full equitable share, regard223
less of the resulting burden on the injured plaintiff.
Because the present law on loss allocation in workers' compensation in Pennsylvania unfairly impacts third party tortfeasors by
making them liable for the entire injury even when only slightly negligent, a modified load sharing as mapped out by the UCFA solution
for insolvent parties might be appropriate. A fairer allocation would
to be reduced by the settlement is greater than the consideration paid.
221. Id. § 6, at 45-46. As the Commissioners note, the result of the second allocation
could be more simply achieved by viewing the immune party as a "phantom" defendant pursuant to § 2(d) and allocating all the fault among the other parties in the first place. Id. at 46
(Comment).
222. Id. at 46 (Comment).
223. Id. For example, say that A is injured in the workplace. The damages are
$100,000. Employer B is 80% negligent and pays $10,000 in statutory compensation benefits.
A third party tortfeasor is 20% negligent. The first alternative, unlimited liability for the employer, is simply inconceivable in today's workers' compensation systems. Under the second
alternative suggested by the Commissioners, A would recover $10,000 from employer B but
only $20,000 (20% x $100,000) from the third party C, for a total recovery of $30,000 for a
$100,000 injury. This would placed the risk of loss on the plaintiff.
In Pennsylvania the rule is just as extreme as the second alternative, at least from the
third party's point of view: the third party tortfeasor, C, ends up paying the entire judgment
because B is subrogated to the rights of the employee as against the third party tortfeasor. The
employer, whether partly at fault or not, gets off scot free. See supra text and accompanying
notes 116-24.
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result if the employer's subrogation rights had some relationship to
its theoretical "equitable share." If its liability is not as great as its
compensation payments, the employer could be subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiff for that excess. If its tort liability is greater
than its compensation payments, then the excess fault could be absorbed between the third party defendant and the plaintiff in some
equitable manner.
Another possibility is that the workers' compensation employer
always be held liable to the full extent of its statutory payments. If
the employer's "equitable share" is less than its statutory payments,
the third party should still make payment for its full equitable share.
The third party's overpayment due to the "excess" paid by the employer could be funneled into a special state insurance fund which
could help indemnify third parties in cases where the employer's
compensation payments do not entirely cover the employer's true liability and plaintiffs in cases where no third party tortfeasor was involved and where a plaintiff's injuries exceeded the statutory workers' compensation payments.
The workers' compensation system as it exists now in Pennsylvania is unfair to third party tortfeasors. Any of these suggestions
for change could be adopted by Pennsylvania's courts since the question of the employer's subrogation rights has not as yet been specifically litigated.2 2 4 It is a topic that clearly deserves reconsideration by
the Pennsylvania Legislature.
XV.

Conclusion

The system of allocation of responsibility among joint
tortfeasors as it now exists in Pennsylvania is not a well-conceived
vehicle to ensure adequacy in compensating injured plaintiffs and equitable load sharing among all parties. Pennsylvania has held fast to
a "first draft" of a loss allocation scheme in adopting its Contribution Act in 1951. By making piecemeal modification of it with various precedents and with the adoption of its Comparative Negligence
Act, Pennsylvania no longer finds itself in the progressive forefront
of the liability allocation field. Pennsylvania legislators and jurists
could well consider the various possibilities now being successfully
utilized in other jurisdictions which mitigate the harshness of unilateral and insensate secondary loss allocations. In addition, the courts
and legislature could seriously consider some of the best elements of
224.

See supra notes 128, 149-150 and accompanying text.
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the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Specific modifications in the
UCFA or in loss allocation systems in operation in other jurisdictions
could easily be made to accommodate some of Pennsylvania's special
substantive interests.
Laurie G. Israel

